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I.     INTRODUCTION 
Business fuels economic growth and development in today’s 
world by producing the goods and services that society needs or wants.  
Viewed in a positive light, business is “a driver of innovation, a creator of 
wealth, a harbinger of economic freedom.”1  Some view business solely as 
a vehicle to generate returns on investment.  But the expectations of soci-
ety regarding business are changing.  Increasingly, business owners and 
managers are being called to account for more than profits and losses.  
Commentators now question the legitimacy of the view that businesses 
should focus only on financial return to investors.  
One could frame the question more pointedly in the following 
terms:  In its relentless pursuit of improving the bottom line, is business 
doing more harm than good to society?  An observer might reach this 
conclusion after glancing at recent news headlines, which are full of exam-
ples of corporate conduct that falls short of societal expectations and re-
veals ethical failures on the part of business.  Such conduct may have neg-
ative impacts on consumers, workers, the environment, and the general 
public. 
Some particularly egregious examples come readily to mind.  One 
headline reads “G.M.’s Ignition Switch Death Toll Hits 100,” referring to 
General Motors’ failure, prior to 2014, to recall cars containing defective 
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1Yvan Allaire, What is the Role of Business?, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Jan. 22, 2014), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/01/role-business/.  
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ignition switches that could cut off a car’s engine and electrical system and 
disable its air bags, even though it had known about the problem for more 
than a decade.2  One of the reasons for the failure was the company’s 
concern with the cost of fixing the problem.3  Another headline reads 
“Building Collapse in Bangladesh Leaves Scores Dead,” referring to the 
2013 Rana Plaza factory collapse that killed more than 1,000 workers in 
the deadliest disaster in the history of the garment industry.4  After an 
investigation, the cause of the collapse was determined to be the use of 
substandard materials in violation of local building codes, violations that 
were overlooked because of bribes that had been paid.5  This lack of regard 
for workers’ health and safety attracted international attention because the 
clothing manufactured under these dangerous conditions bore the labels 
of well-known brands that were sold through retailers in the United States 
and Europe.6  Once again, cost considerations figured prominently in this 
case since low-cost manufacturing production in countries like Bangladesh 
is possible due to lack of safeguards for worker well-being.7  Yet another 
headline reads “Oil Spills Into Gulf After Rig Disaster,” referring to the 
2010 Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion that resulted in eleven deaths 
                                                 
 
2 Bill Vlasic, G.M.’s Ignition Switch Death Toll Hits 100, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/gms-ignition-switch-death-toll-hits-
100.html. 
3 Christopher Jensen, In General Motors Recalls, Inaction and Trail of Fatal Crashes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/03/business/in-general-motors-re-
calls-inaction-and-trail-of-fatal-crashes.html. 
4 Julfikar Ali Manik & Jim Yardley, Building Collapse in Bangladesh Leaves Scores Dead, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/world/asia/bangladesh-
building-collapse.html. 
5 Id.  
6 See Clare O’Connor, These Retailers Involved in Bangladesh Factory Disaster Have Yet to Com-
pensate Victims, FORBES (Apr. 26, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ clareocon-
nor/2014/04/26/these-retailers-involved-in-bangladesh-factory-disaster-have -yet-to-
compensate-victims/#25e2111957c5.  
7 Rachel Abrams, Retailers like H&M and Walmart Fall Short of Pledges to Overseas Workers, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/business/ interna-
tional/top-retailers-fall-short-of-commitments-to-overseas-workers.html. 
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and led to what has been called the worst environmental disaster in Amer-
ican history, namely a massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico that contin-
ued for three months before it could be contained, leading to widespread 
damage to the ecology of the region, including marine life and wildlife.8  
Subsequent investigations of these events identified a number of causes, 
including a series of cost-cutting decisions and use of an insufficient safety 
system by British Petroleum, the Deepwater Horizon’s lessee, and its part-
ners.9  In all of these cases, and in the many others that also could be cited 
for the same proposition, business management seems to have made de-
cisions that placed profits ahead of people and the planet. 
These cases, and numerous others like them, raise concerns in the 
public’s mind about the lack of social responsibility and accountability of 
such enterprises and why their consumer safety, labor, environmental, and 
human rights records are so poor.  Due to such concerns, today’s business 
leaders are increasingly under pressure to answer for these and other neg-
ative impacts of their enterprises on society. 
The notion that corporations are accountable for their social and 
environmental impacts has begun to crystallize under the heading of cor-
porate social responsibility (“CSR”).  Of course, businesses are expected 
to operate within the bounds of the law.  However, CSR is a broader con-
cept that goes beyond the expectation of legal compliance.  CSR implies 
voluntary choices on the part of business to operate in a manner that re-
                                                 
 
8 Russell Gold, Guy Chazan & Ben Casselman, Oil Spills into Gulf After Rig Disaster, WALL 
ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2010, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052748704627704575204590586862162. 
9 Obama Oil Spill Commission’s Final Report Blames Disaster on Cost-Cutting by BP and Partners, 
THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 5, 2011, 11:10 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ finance/news-
bysector/energy/oilandgas/8242557/Obama-oil-spill-commissions-final-report-
blames-disaster-on-cost-cutting-by-BP-and-partners.html; Ian Urbina, BP Officials Took a 
Riskier Option for Well Casing, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2010), http://query.ny-
times.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00E1D6113BF934A15756C0A9669D8B63&page-
wanted=all. 
 For a discussion of the BP Oil Disaster and corporate social responsibility, see Miriam 
A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit:  Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 988–999 (2011). 
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spects people and the planet even if not mandated by government regula-
tors and is now considered part of sustainable business practice.  The pa-
rameters, content, and means of achieving CSR are murky, but most com-
mentators agree that CSR is a good thing and we need more of it.  One 
hears criticisms of CSR as a desirable goal for managers from time to time, 
but more and more those voices are being drowned out by the chorus of 
proponents of integrating CSR into business strategy. 
There are many open questions surrounding CSR, but one of the 
most important ones concerns the optimal strategies for improving busi-
ness conduct.  One avenue for achieving greater CSR that has emerged in 
recent years is a disclosure-based approach in which companies voluntarily 
report on non-financial aspects of their operations and in some cases, 
quantify risks associated with such aspects and explain how such risks 
might impact financial performance.  This type of reporting has been la-
belled non-financial reporting, CSR reporting, sustainability reporting, and 
triple bottom line reporting, among other names.  Such terms are used 
interchangeably in this article.  While the term “sustainability” is associated 
in the minds of some with environmental issues only, its meaning in this 
context is broader, with the term “sustainability reporting” being synony-
mous with non-financial reporting.  
This disclosure-based approach is an alternative to enhanced gov-
ernment regulation of business and is premised on the notion that en-
hanced transparency about business operations will lead to improved per-
formance, including improvement on key performance indicators relevant 
to CSR.  Consistent with the notion of CSR itself, CSR reporting has tra-
ditionally involved a voluntary commitment by enterprises to disclose mat-
ters beyond the financial performance information mandated by govern-
ment regulators.  However, in recent years, a number of countries have 
begun to mandate non-financial reporting in response to concerns about 
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the low rates of such reporting and the poor quality of non-financial dis-
closures.  Such mandatory reporting requirements vary widely in scope 
and content and no uniformity exists among such national laws.10 
A problem plaguing non-financial reporting, both voluntary and 
mandatory, is the lack of a consistent reporting standard that would permit 
internal benchmarking and comparison across companies.  Many large 
companies have chosen to use one of the non-financial reporting frame-
works developed by the Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”) (such frame-
works collectively referred to as “GRI frameworks”), such as the Sustain-
ability Reporting Standards (“GRI Standards”), making the GRI frame-
works the apparent gold standard.11  Typically, however, national laws on 
non-financial reporting, at least in Europe, do not mandate the use of the 
GRI frameworks or any other reporting standard.  The result is wide var-
iation in the amount and type of information disclosed. 
This article contributes to the literature on CSR and CSR reporting 
by examining the significance of a recent European Union (“EU”) di-
rective mandating that certain large enterprises disclose information about 
their non-financial performance in key areas of concern to advocates of 
CSR.12  Pursuant to EU Directive 2014/95/EU (“2014 EU Directive”), 
countries that are members of the EU (“Member States”)  were required 
to enact laws containing certain minimum requirements for such reporting 
by December 6, 2016.13  This article also touches on the development of 
mandatory non-financial reporting in two Member States that have been 
                                                 
 
10 For a discussion of mandatory CSR reporting requirements in India and China, see 
Afra Afsharipour & Shruti Rana, The Emergence of New Corporate Social Responsibility Regimes 
in China and India, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 175 (2014). 
11 Sustainability Reporting Standards, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.glob-
alreporting.org. The Sustainability Reporting Standards replace the earlier reporting 
standard, the G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (“GRI Guidelines”).  The GRI 
Standards are required for reports published on or after July 1, 2018.  The GRI Guidelines 
remain available before July 1, 2018.   
12 Directive 2014/95/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2014 Amending Directive 2013/34/EU As Regards Disclosure of Non-financial and Di-
versity Information by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. L 330 [here-
inafter 2014 EU Directive]. 
13 Id. at art. 4 (discussing “Transposition”). 
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frontrunners in this area, namely France and Denmark, and their imple-
mentation of the 2014 EU Directive into their national laws.  Such analysis 
takes place within the larger framework of the global growth of CSR re-
porting and the significance of these EU developments for the future of 
such reporting. 
 The thesis of this paper is as follows.  At first glance, the 2014 EU 
Directive appears to represent a bold move by European governments, 
since it has been billed as a mandate of non-financial reporting as a matter 
of national law that will lead to greater information transparency and exert 
pressure on low-performing businesses to improve.  However, a closer 
look reveals that the picture is more complicated.  Instead of consisting 
exclusively of a government mandate to report non-financial information, 
the 2014 EU Directive combines elements of both mandatory and volun-
tary reporting, representing an interesting mix of public and private actor 
involvement that seems characteristic of evolving reporting trends for 
non-financial information.  
 Although such Directive may result in a greater quantity of disclo-
sure, it may not be as successful in achieving the goal of improved trans-
parency as its proponents have suggested.  One reason is that the EU Di-
rective may be considered flawed due to weaknesses identified by the au-
thor in several of its key provisions.  This conclusion is based also on an 
examination of the experiences of some Member States that adopted man-
datory non-financial reporting requirements prior to adoption of the Di-
rective but did not see an improvement in the quality of reporting as a 
result, although some saw an increase in the quantity of reporting.  Ex-
trapolating from those historical cases to the projected impact of the 2014 
EU Directive in Member States, it is possible that more reporting, but not 
necessarily better reporting, will be the result.  The element of government 
regulation embodied in the Directive may not be a sufficient condition to 
achieve the policy goal of improved CSR reporting.  Other conditions 
needed to achieve that end and yet to be identified may be missing in some 
Member States.  
  Nevertheless, the 2014 EU Directive is an important development 
because of the signals it sends on the importance of non-financial report-
ing to corporate stakeholders, as well as the lack of effectiveness of prior 
2018]             EVOLVING NORMS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY               625 
 
voluntary approaches alone in fostering such disclosure.  Moreover, the 
Directive illustrates that the process of achieving greater transparency by 
businesses on social and environmental issues is difficult, appears to be 
evolutionary in nature, and will take more time and effort to accomplish 
in the years ahead.  
 As such, the EU experience in this area may provide useful in-
struction for other countries seeking to achieve similar goals of higher lev-
els of improved non-financial reporting.  Lessons from the EU experience 
may be of particular interest to observers in the United States where the 
state of CSR reporting is less well-developed compared to that in other 
countries.   
 The analysis will proceed as follows.  Section II will explore the 
meaning of CSR and the rationale for use of non-financial reporting as a 
means to move business in the direction of greater social responsibility.  It 
will also discuss current global developments in non-financial disclosure, 
including the movement from voluntary to mandatory CSR reporting in 
some countries.  Section III will analyze the growth of non-financial re-
porting in the EU by tracing the historic development of, and the policy 
rationale behind, the 2014 EU Directive.  It will also illustrate the chal-
lenges associated with implementation of non-financial reporting require-
ments at the national level by referring to the experiences of two Member 
States that have been leaders in mandating CSR reporting, namely France 
and Denmark.  Section IV will critique the 2014 EU Directive and the 
trend it represents for non-financial reporting.  Section V will conclude. 
II.     THE MEANING OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
THE ROLE OF NON-FINANCIAL REPORTING  
This Section II lays the groundwork for an analysis and critique of 
the 2014 EU Directive. It does so by examining current issues surrounding 
the meaning of CSR and the role of non-financial reporting in promoting 
enhanced social responsibility by businesses. 
A wide variety of actors have argued that businesses have obliga-
tions to conduct their operations in a socially responsible manner.  These 
include those directly involved with businesses such as investors, employ-
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ees, and consumers, as well as governments, non-governmental organiza-
tions, intergovernmental organizations, and scholars in the fields of man-
agement and law.  This notion forms the foundation of current discourse 
on CSR, which seeks to hold businesses accountable for the impacts of 
their operations.   
CSR stands in contrast to the traditional view of the purpose of 
business, which is to maximize financial return for investors.  Economist 
Milton Friedman advocated for this view in his often-cited 1970 New 
York Times opinion piece entitled “The Social Responsibility of Business 
is to Increase Its Profits,” when he stated:  
[A] corporate executive is an employee of 
the owners of the business.  He has direct 
responsibility to his employers.  That re-
sponsibility is to conduct the business in 
accordance with their desires, which gener-
ally will be to make as much money as pos-
sible while conforming to the basic rules of 
the society, both those embodied in law 
and those embodied in ethical custom.14   
The view that business managers’ sole responsibility is shareholder 
value maximization is sometimes referred to as the shareholder primacy 
theory.  This view has been criticized by many others, including law pro-
fessor Lynn Stout, who argued in her 2012 book entitled The Shareholder 
Value Myth:  How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, and 
the Public that the shareholder primacy theory is harmful to a wide variety 
of corporate constituencies, is based on factually mistaken claims about 
law, and that support for this theory is crumbling.15   
                                                 
 
14 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 13, 1970), http://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-
the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html. 
15 Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, CORNELL L. FACULTY PUBLICATIONS (Apr. 19, 
2013), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/771 (discussing LYNN STOUT, THE 
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Lynn Stout’s view is echoed by numerous commentators.  It is safe 
to say that the shareholder primacy theory is losing its grip and the goal of 
promoting CSR is gaining ascendancy.  As business professor Min-Dong 
Paul Lee has noted, “[CSR] has been transformed from an irrelevant . . . 
idea to one of the most orthodox and widely accepted concepts in the 
business world . . . .”16  Many businesses are of the view that adopting CSR 
strategies is not only desirable but necessary.  In his 2003 book entitled 
The Planetary Bargain:  Corporate Social Responsibility Matters, business profes-
sor Michael Hopkins argued that, “[i]n time, it will not be possible to con-
duct business without being socially responsible . . . . [N]ew rules or cor-
porate laws may well be unnecessary, because corporations will see for 
themselves – and many have seen this already – the need to behave more 
responsibly in the social arena.”17 
 One commentator from the world of social investing has noted 
that the growth of CSR has been especially noteworthy in Europe.  Steven 
D. Lydenberg, who is affiliated with Domini Social Investments, and who 
wrote a 2003 book about management strategies to integrate CSR entitled 
Corporations and the Public Interest:  Guiding the Invisible Hand, has referred to 
CSR as “a major secular development, driven by a long-term reevaluation 
of the role of corporations in society.”18  In his view, compared to the 
United States, this reevaluation is stronger in Europe, where the view that 
companies have duties to stakeholders as well as shareholders has taken 
hold, noting also that “the European influence will be very hard to resist 
over the long run.”19 
                                                 
 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH:  HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVES-
TORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (Berrett-Koehler Pub. 2012)).  
16 Min-Dong Paul Lee, A Review of the Theories of Corporate Social Responsibility: Its Evolutionary 
Path and the Road Ahead, 10 INT’L J. OF MGMT. REV. 53, 53 (2007). 
17 MICHAEL HOPKINS, THE PLANETARY BARGAIN:  CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY MATTERS xii (Rutledge 2003). 
18 Edward Teach, Two Views of Virtue, CFO, (Dec. 15, 2005), http://ww2.cfo.com/risk-
compliance/2005/12/two-views-of-virtue/ (citing STEVEN D. LYDENBERG, CORPORA-
TIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:  GUIDING THE INVISIBLE HAND, 31 (Berrett-Koehler 
Pub. 2005). 
19 Id. 
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While the notion of CSR has gained traction in recent years, there 
are numerous conceptual difficulties that have not been settled.  The man-
agement literature is rich with journal articles and books that have tackled 
this topic, including the definition of CSR, the rationale for pursuit of CSR 
by business managers, and the appropriate strategies for promoting greater 
CSR in business.  To a lesser extent, legal scholars have also engaged on 
this subject, focusing on the fiduciary duties of managers and whether they 
may lawfully take into account the interests of stakeholders other than 
shareholders, the use of voluntary codes of conduct seeking to enhance 
CSR, the promulgation of laws that have codified CSR norms, and the 
extent and specific content of CSR obligations. While much ink has been 
spilled, CSR is still an ambiguous concept in several respects.  
One often-repeated criticism of CSR is that the definition of this 
concept is too vague and there is no consensus surrounding the meaning 
of the term. In fact, a review of the literature discussed herein reveals that 
there are certain common elements that CSR definitions share.  This au-
thor believes that the problem lies not with the definition, but with lack of 
clarity regarding the business rationale for and business strategies needed 
to achieve CSR, as well as lack of clear guidelines on the content of CSR 
obligations.20 
While the language of CSR definitions may vary, there is some 
consensus around core concepts.  Management professor David Vogel, 
who wrote the influential book The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits 
of Corporate Social Responsibility, defined CSR as “practices that improve the 
workplace and benefit society in ways that go above and beyond what 
companies are legally required to do.” 21  Other definitions are more ex-
pansive and generally include the following elements: a voluntary under-
taking to engage in conduct that goes beyond what is legally required, a 
commitment to addressing the interests of a broad spectrum of corporate 
                                                 
 
20 Daniel Kindermann, Corporate Social Responsibility in the EU, 1993–2013: Institutional Am-
biguity, Economic Crises, Business Legitimacy and Bureaucratic Politics, 51 J. COMMON MARKET 
STUD. 702 (2013) (discussing ambiguity of definition and rationale for CSR in Europe). 
21 DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPO-
RATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 2 (Brookings 2006).    
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constituencies or stakeholders other than shareholders, and a focus not 
only on financial performance, but also on social and environmental per-
formance.  
This description of the core concepts found in CSR definitions is 
consistent with the results of a study on this topic conducted by manage-
ment professor Alexander Dahlsrud.  Dahlsrud analyzed 37 different def-
initions of CSR and found that, while there was variation in the exact lan-
guage used, this group of definitions consistently referred to five dimen-
sions: the natural environment, the relationship between business and so-
ciety, socio-economic or financial aspects including business operations, 
interaction with stakeholders, and voluntariness that encompassed actions 
not required by law.22  He concluded that such consistency across defini-
tions made “the lack of one universally accepted definition less problem-
atic.”23  However, Dahlsrud criticized the definitions for failing to address 
what optimal CSR consisted of and how to develop strategies to achieve 
that goal, noting that a successful approach is content specific and the 
details of specific CSR issues to be addressed and how to engage with 
stakeholders must be developed for individual businesses.24 
An influential definition of CSR was developed by management 
professor Archie B. Carroll, who has written extensively about many dif-
ferent aspects of CSR.  Carroll developed a framework for understanding 
CSR that identifies four categories of obligations of business to society, 
namely the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary.25  In the economic 
category, Carroll placed the responsibility of business to produce goods 
and services that society wants and to sell them at a profit.26  Under legal, 
he placed the obligation for business to fulfill its economic missions within 
                                                 
 
22 Alexander Dahlsrud, How Corporate Social Responsibility is Defined: An Analysis of 37 Defi-
nitions, 15 CORP. SOC. RESP. ENVTL. MGMT. 4–5 (2008). 
23 Id. at 6. 
24 Id.  
25 Archie B. Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, 4 ACAD. 
OF MANAGEMENT REV. 497, 499 (1979). 
26 Id. at 500. 
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the framework of legal and regulatory requirements.27 He defined ethical 
obligations as societal expectations of business conduct that exceed legal 
requirements.28 Finally, he described discretionary responsibilities as those 
involving individual choices to address social issues, which are purely vol-
untary in nature and not expected in a moral or ethical sense, such as phi-
lanthropy.29  In Carroll’s view, all four of these responsibilities should be 
fulfilled by business at all times, meaning that a firm committed to CSR 
“should strive to make a profit, obey the law, be ethical, and be a good 
corporate citizen.”30 
Carroll’s definition of CSR is useful in that it brings together the 
traditional and new responsibilities of business, which he also terms the 
old and new social contracts between business and society.  His definition 
makes more explicit the notion of CSR when he contends that “the eco-
nomic and legal responsibilities are ‘required’, the ethical responsibilities 
are ‘expected’, and the discretionary responsibilities are ‘desired.’”31  It is 
the scope of these latter two categories, namely the nature and extent of 
the ethical and discretionary responsibilities that go beyond the economic 
and legal obligations, that remains subject to debate.32   
Looking at all four categories of business responsibilities in Car-
roll’s definition is also helpful in discussing the rationale for CSR, includ-
ing the so-called “business case” for CSR, because it includes financial 
performance in a constellation of obligations that also encompasses the 
ethical and discretionary activities that many would identify with CSR.  
                                                 
 
27 Id.  
28 Id. 
29 Id.  In his later writings, Carol would come to collapse these four categories into three, 
combining the ethical and discretionary, and arguing that philanthropy fell within both 
the ethical and discretionary domains. See Mark S. Schwartz & Archie B Carroll, Corporate 
Social Responsibility: A Three-Domain Approach, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 503 (2003). 
30 Archie B. Carroll, The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Manage-
ment of Organizational Stakeholders, BUS. HORIZONS, July–Aug. 1991, at 39, 40, 43.  
31 Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsi-
bility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice, 12 INT’L J. OF MGMT. REV. 85, 90 (2010).  
32 Id. 
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The “business case” for CSR refers to a connection between CSR policies 
and improved corporate performance. There is a large body of manage-
ment literature that seeks to establish such a link, thereby justifying CSR 
by claiming that there is a “market for virtue” and that businesses will be 
“doing well by doing good.”33 
A number of commentators in the field of management studies 
have traced the development of CSR from the 1950s to the present and 
noted a shift over time from a focus on being a good corporate citizen by 
doing good works for society to a focus on benefits to business from CSR 
policies, namely the “business case” for CSR, with such shift starting in 
the 1980s.34  Management gurus including Peter Drucker and Michael Por-
ter weighed in on the topic.  Peter Drucker proposed a “new meaning” of 
CSR, contending that profitability and responsibility were not only com-
patible, but that businesses should view social problems as opportunities 
that they could be paid to solve.35  As Drucker expressed it, the proper 
social responsibility of business is “to tame the dragon, that is to turn a 
social problem into economic opportunity and economic benefit, into 
productive capacity, into human competence, into well-paid jobs, and into 
wealth.”36  Michael Porter suggested that companies should connect their 
philanthropic expenditures “to areas that improve their long-term com-
petitive potential,” which has led some companies to adopt strategic phi-
lanthropy by linking their charitable giving to their business missions.37 
                                                 
 
33 David Vogel, Is There a Market for Virtue? The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity, 47 CAL. MGMT. REV. 19 (2005). For an expanded discussion of this topic, see VOGEL, 
THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE, supra note 21.  
34 Carroll & Shabana, supra note 31, at 87–88; see also Archie B. Carroll, Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct, 38 BUS. AND SOC’Y 268 (1999); Lee, supra 
note 16.    
35 Peter Drucker, The New Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, 26 CAL. MGMT. REV. 
53, 55 (1984). 
36 Id. at 62. 
37 Michael Porter & Mark Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy, 67 
HARV. BUS. REV. 56, 67 (2002). 
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Eventually, over time, several different business rationales 
emerged in the management literature to supplant the earlier social ration-
ales for pursuing CSR strategies, namely reducing cost and risk, strength-
ening legitimacy and reputation, and gaining a competitive advantage, 
among others.38  A growing number of academic commentators, along 
with managers and investors, began to embrace the notion that strategic 
adoption of CSR could lead to financial rewards in the long run.  The so-
called “business case” for CSR was premised on the notion that financial 
performance and social performance were directly linked and was under-
stood to mean that higher profits would result from CSR strategies.39 
However, despite repeated efforts by researchers to empirically 
verify that CSR policies positively affect the bottom line performance of 
a corporation, the “business case” for CSR has never been proven.40  Da-
vid Vogel noted that evidence of the “business case” for CSR is inconclu-
sive, with some empirical studies showing a positive relationship, some 
finding a negative relationship, and yet others finding the relationship to 
be either neutral or mixed.41  Nevertheless, he stated that “[i]t is not nec-
essary to find a positive statistical relationship between CSR and profits to 
claim that some firms may benefit financially from being more responsible 
or suffer from being irresponsible.”42  In other words, it has been possible 
for businesses to justify pursuing CSR strategies based on other perceived 
benefits apart from a direct link to increased profits.43  A number of com-
mentators have identified other reasons for companies to pursue CSR, of-
ten focusing on the importance of engaging with a wide variety of corpo-
rate constituencies or stakeholders, including employees, consumers, and 
                                                 
 
38 Elizabeth C. Kurucz et al., The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility, in ANDREW 
CRANE, ET AL., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 83, 
86 (Oxford 2008).  
39 Vogel, supra note 33. 
40 Id.       
41 Id. at 29.     
42 Id. at 33.     
43 Id. at 33–34. (noting that such benefits may be “elusive”).  
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members of the general public.44  Among the non-“business case” benefits 
that have been suggested are building community ties and maintaining a 
“social license” to operate, increasing morale and attachment of employ-
ees, attracting potential employees, developing future customers, and cre-
ating an environment in which the business can prosper.45  However, such 
benefits may prove elusive and will only be obtained for some businesses 
under certain circumstances.46 
Although the “business case” for CSR has never been proved, and 
although other possible benefits to business are hard to pinpoint, many 
corporations now behave as though it is in their self-interest to pursue 
CSR policies.  An increasing number seek to talk the talk of CSR, although 
it is not at all clear that they also walk the walk.  More and more frequently, 
businesses are disclosing information about their CSR policies, often on 
their websites, in various written reports that they issue, and in their ad-
vertising.   
Currently, there is no agreement on a common set of business ac-
tivities that constitute socially responsible behavior that everyone agrees 
on and there is no standardization of disclosure by business of their CSR 
policies.  While there is some consensus around a rather broad definition 
of CSR, as discussed above, such definition does not clarify the exact con-
tent of CSR obligations.  This lack of a common understanding of the 
content of CSR allows businesses to choose the manner in which they 
portray their business operations in the public arena.  While businesses 
may like such flexibility, this lack of standards is troubling.  The danger of 
failing to specify the components of virtuous corporate behavior is that 
businesses are then left free to decide what counts as responsible conduct, 
often to promote their own self-interest and to the detriment of the inter-
ests of business stakeholders.  For example, in the oil and gas industry, 
                                                 
 
44 Joshua D. Margolis & James P. Walsh, Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking Social Initiatives 
by Business, 280 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 268 (2003).  
45 Charles J. Fombrun et al., Opportunity Platforms and Safety Nets: Corporate Citizenship and 
Reputational Risk, 105 BUS. SOC’Y REV. 85, 86 (2000).  
46 Vogel, supra note 33. 
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companies have been accused of engaging in “greenwashing,” the practice 
of using public relations channels and advertising to promote a “green” 
image of environmental responsibility while in fact engaging in potentially 
damaging activities in their business operations.47  
Various parties, including intergovernmental organizations, non-
governmental organizations, business investors, industry groups, and busi-
nesses themselves, have sought to fill this void by specifying the content 
of CSR through a variety of codes of conduct.  Such codes can apply to 
individual businesses, or to businesses in a particular industry or particular 
region, or they may be global in scope, applying to multinational corpora-
tions and a wide variety of other businesses around the world.  Generally 
speaking, these codes of conduct are non-binding and constitute voluntary 
undertakings that businesses subscribe to, mirroring the definition of CSR 
itself, which implies conduct that is voluntary in nature.  This proliferation 
of standards is helpful in that there is now some content to CSR for which 
businesses should be held accountable, although there is no consensus on 
the exact standards to which businesses should be held and the content of 
such codes varies widely.   
The most influential sets of standards are those that have been 
promulgated at the international level, including the United Nations 
Global Compact (“U.N. Global Compact”), the Organization of Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises, and the Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework.48  The most widely-accepted of these international initiatives 
is the U.N. Global Compact, an initiative launched by then United Nations 
                                                 
 
47 For a discussion of greenwashing in the context of the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico, see Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 9, at 985. 
48 See generally Who We Are, The Power of Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles (last visited Mar. 18, 
2018); OECD (2011), OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Publishing, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en; Guiding Principles on Business and Hu-
man Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER 
(2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ GuidingPrinciplesBusi-
nessHR_EN.pdf. 
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Secretary-General Kofi Annan, at the World Economic Forum in 1999.49  
With over 9,000 businesses as signatories in 161 countries, the U.N. 
Global Compact describes itself as “the world’s largest corporate sustain-
ability initiative.”50 
The U.N. Global Compact seeks to align business operations and 
strategies with ten universally-accepted principles in the areas of human 
rights, labor standards, the environment, and anti-corruption, and to en-
courage businesses to take actions to advance societal goals.51  The ten 
core principles are drawn from United Nations Conventions and Declara-
tions, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.52   
The U.N. Global Compact invites businesses to subscribe to these 
principles by becoming members.  Members are required to have the ap-
proval of their chief executive to participate and are asked to make an 
annual contribution to support the work of the U.N. Global Compact.53  
Members are encouraged to make the U.N. Global Compact and its prin-
ciples an integral part of business strategy, day to-day operations, and or-
ganizational culture; and incorporate the UN Global Compact and its prin-
ciples in the decision-making processes of the highest-level governance 
                                                 
 
49 Press Release, United Nations Secretary General, Secretary-General Proposes Global 
Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, In Address To World Economic Fo-
rum, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6881 (Feb. 1, 1999), http://www.un.org/press/ 
en/1999/19990201.sgsm6881.html.  
50 Our Participants, UNITED NATIONAL GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcom-
pact.org/what-is-gc/participants (last visited Mar. 18, 2018).  
51 Who We Are, The World’s Largest Corporate Sustainability Initiative, UNITED NATIONAL 
GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc (last visited Mar. 18, 
2018).   
52 UNITED NATIONAL GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 48.  
53 Who We Are, About the Global Compact, Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED NATIONS 
GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/about/faq (last visited Mar. 18, 
2018).  
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body.54  In addition, members are expected to publicly advocate for the 
U.N. Global Compact through public statements in the form of press re-
leases and speeches.55  Finally, members must report to their stakeholders 
annually through a “Communication on Progress,” that documents pro-
gress toward implementing the ten core principles and “[e]fforts to sup-
port societal priorities” and can be incorporated in the annual report or a 
standalone sustainability report.56 
There are numerous other CSR initiatives that have been devel-
oped.57  They differ in their source, coverage, scope of responsibilities, and 
the extent to which they impose affirmative obligations of compliance, 
monitoring, and third party auditing or assurances.58  In spite of such var-
iations, it should be noted that such CSR initiatives frequently focus on 
four key areas of responsibility, namely respect for the environment, social 
and labor practices that uphold the rights of workers, respect for human 
rights, and a prohibition on bribery and corruption in business dealings, 
although some frameworks cover more and others cover fewer areas. 
Apart from the U.N. Global Compact, most other CSR initiatives 
have had only limited success in attracting businesses that will subscribe 
to the standards.  The most popular standards are those that are deemed 
most “flexible” by businesses, implying that the standards are malleable.  
In addition, there usually is little, if any, monitoring of compliance required 
under any such set of standards.  As a result, the success of such standard-
setting exercises as a driver for greater corporate accountability is ques-
tionable. 
                                                 
 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 For a listing of other international initiatives, see WIM BARTELS ET AL., CARROTS & 
STICKS: GLOBAL TRENDS IN SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING REGULATION AND POLICY, 
KPMG (2016), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/05/carrots-
and-sticks-may-2016.pdf.  
58 Id.  
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In addition to voluntary codes of conduct, other approaches to 
CSR are emerging.  In some cases, mandatory legal rules are being put in 
place rather than relying on voluntary action by business.  One example is 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits bribery in inter-
national business transactions, and similar laws in other countries prohib-
iting such conduct.59  An alternative approach to such substantive regula-
tion of corporate behavior is a disclosure-based approach in which busi-
nesses issue non-financial reports covering their CSR activities.  An in-
creasing number of companies are publishing such reports in addition to 
the mandated financial reporting required by government regulators.  In 
general, businesses prefer non-financial reporting over government regu-
lation, which may explain the upswing in such reporting in recent years. 
Non-financial reporting is sometimes referred to as triple bottom 
line reporting.  John Elkington, founder of SustainAbility, a consulting 
firm for sustainable businesses, and a leader in the CSR movement, coined 
this phrase to describe his business accounting framework encompassing 
three different bottom lines:  (1) the traditional measure of corporate 
profit, namely the bottom line of the profit and loss account, (2) the peo-
ple account, which measures the social responsibility of an organization’s 
operations, and (3) the planet account, which measures the environmental 
responsibility of an organization.60  In Elkington’s view, only businesses 
that fully account for all three bottom lines—profit, people and planet—
are fully accounting for the costs of doing business.61 
                                                 
 
59 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq. (2012); 
There are also international treaties prohibiting bribery in international business, such as 
the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the OECD Antibribery Con-
vention. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, U.N. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. 
Res. 58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003); OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions (Nov. 21, 1997).    
60 Triple Bottom Line, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/14301663. For a further discussion of triple bottom line reporting, see JOHN 
ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS:  THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST CENTURY 
BUSINESS (Capstone 1997).  
61  Id. 
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The rationales advanced for non-financial reporting by corpora-
tions mirror those heard for pursuing CSR strategies more generally.  Car-
roll and Shabana have noted that corporations believe they enhance their 
legitimacy and reputation through disclosure of information about their 
social and environmental performance by demonstrating that their opera-
tions are consistent with social norms and legitimate expectations.62  The 
GRI, an organization promoting sustainability initiatives for business in-
cluding non-financial reporting,63  believes that companies should provide 
non-financial disclosure based on “business case” grounds “because being 
accountable reduces risk and capital costs, attracts and retains customers 
and staff, supports stakeholder engagement and creates new business op-
portunities.”64  Law professor Virginia Harper Ho focuses on the link be-
tween environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) performance and 
investment risk and return, noting that financial analysts and investment 
advisors now use tools to assist investors in determining how firms incor-
porate ESG information into business strategy, risk management, corpo-
rate governance, and value creation.65 
An increasing number of companies are publishing CSR reports 
in addition to the mandated financial reporting required by government 
regulators.  The global accounting firm KPMG has examined global trends 
for non-financial reports among Global Fortune 250 companies, namely 
the world’s 250 largest companies, noting an upswing in such disclosure 
                                                 
 
62 Carroll & Shabana, supra note 31, at 99. 
63 “GRI is an international independent organization that helps businesses, governments 
and other organizations understand and communicate the impact of business on critical 
sustainability issues such as climate change, human rights, corruption and many others.”  
About GRI, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, (last visited Sept. 25, 2017), 
https://www.globalreporting.org/Information/about-gri/Pages/default.aspx. 
64 FOSTER ELECTRIC REPORT, CERES, OTHERS CALL FOR USE OF NEW ENVIRONMEN-
TAL REPORTING GUIDELINES (2006).    
65 Virginia Harper Ho, “Comply or Explain” and the Future of Nonfinancial Reporting, 21 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 317, 322 (2017).  
2018]             EVOLVING NORMS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY               639 
 
among this group of companies over time.66  In its 2015 publication enti-
tled Currents of Change: The KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 
2015 (“2015 KPMG Report”), KPMG noted that 92% of Global Fortune 
250 companies engage in some form of sustainability reporting.67  The 
2015 KPMG Report also surveyed the N100, namely the 100 largest com-
panies in each of 45 countries, and noted that almost three-quarters of 
N100 companies reported on CSR.68  There are regional differences in 
reporting practices among companies, with Europe traditionally the 
leader, although in recent years the Asia Pacific region and the Americas 
have gained ground.69  The 2015 KPMG Report also identified several 
significant trends in CSR reporting by this group of companies.    
KPMG, in conjunction with several other organizations including 
the GRI and the United Nations Environment Program, has also con-
ducted studies tracing the evolution of such reporting and the characteris-
tics of the instruments that drive reporting.  In its 2016 publication entitled 
Carrots & Sticks: Global Trends in Sustainability Reporting Regulation and Policy 
(“2016 Carrots & Sticks Report”), KPMG and its co-authors noted rapid 
and significant growth in the total number of instruments that require or 
encourage organizations to report information about their sustainability 
performance.70  The 2016 Carrots & Sticks Report also highlighted im-
portant trends in such reporting that are consistent with those identified 
in the 2015 KPMG Report.  
The first noteworthy trend set forth in these KPMG Reports is 
the emergence of mandated CSR reporting.  Traditionally, companies have 
                                                 
 
66 ADRIAN KING & WIM BARTELS, CURRENTS OF CHANGE: THE KPMG SURVEY OF 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2015, at 30 (2015), https://assets.kpmg.com 
/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/02/kpmg-international-survey-of-corporate-responsi-
bility-reporting-2015.pdf.  Such reporting fluctuated between 90-95% over the preceding 
four years.    
67 Id.    
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 31–32. 
70 BARTELS ET AL., supra note 57, at 10.  
640          TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW          [Vol. 19 
 
engaged in CSR reporting on a voluntary basis and many argued that it 
should remain that way.71  But that is changing and the most important 
driver of the recent growth in non-financial reporting is mandatory stand-
ards imposed through government regulation and stock exchange rules.72  
This regulatory growth is especially noteworthy in Europe, the Asia Pacific 
region, and in Latin America.73  One of the most significant developments 
is the growth of mandated non-financial reporting in Europe as a result of 
the historical evolution of EU legal instruments culminating in the 2014 
EU Directive, which is the focus of this article.  
A second trend relates to where such information is disclosed and 
whether the information provided is independently verified through third 
party assurances or auditing.  In the past, many companies disclosed such 
information in standalone reports focusing exclusively on sustainability 
topics and companies considered third party auditing to be undesirable 
and therefore optional.74  However, according to the 2015 KPMG Report, 
the trend has shifted and it has become standard practice for the world’s 
largest companies to include CSR information in their annual reports and 
most of these companies now have their data independently audited.75  
There is an emerging trend toward “integrated reporting” in which a com-
pany issues a single report combining financial and non-financial disclo-
sure and draws the main connections between social, environmental, and 
economic actions and material outcomes for the company.  However, the 
                                                 
 
71 KPMG INT’L AND THE UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAM, CARROTS & STICKS FOR 
STARTERS: CURRENT TRENDS AND APPROACHES IN VOLUNTARY AND MANDATORY 
STANDARDS FOR SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 10 (2006). 
72 Id.; KING & BARTELS, supra note 66, at 28. 
73 BARTELS ET AL., supra note 57, at 10.  
74 KPMG INT’L AND THE UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAM, supra note 71, at 10.   
75 Sixty percent of Global 250 companies include CSR disclosure in their annual reports. 
Approximately two-thirds of such companies use independent third party assurances. 
KING & BARTELS, supra note 66, at 5.  
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2015 KPMG Report states that integrated reporting is the exception rather 
than the rule.76  
A third trend relates to the content of non-financial reporting.  As 
mentioned previously, there has been a proliferation of reporting instru-
ments developed in recent years, yet no clear consensus has emerged on 
what should be reported.  Some reporting frameworks cover specific en-
vironmental or social topics, while others require or encourage reporting 
of general sustainability information.77  For mandatory reporting, the re-
quirements can vary widely.  The most popular frameworks for voluntary 
reporting among large companies have been those developed by the GRI 
since 1997.78  The 2015 KPMG Report states that three-quarters of Global 
250 companies use such GRI frameworks.79  The GRI invites diverse 
stakeholders to participate in and lend expertise to the process of devel-
oping its frameworks.80  Such standards incorporate widely-recognized in-
ternational norms like those contained in the U.N. Global Compact and 
contain a set of key performance indicators on CSR issues, including hu-
man rights, anti-discrimination, labor, anti-corruption, and the environ-
ment.81  The GRI frameworks have been revised on several occasions over 
the years to incorporate improvements, with the GRI Standards being the 
most recent version.82   
The picture that emerges from the KPMG Reports is of ever more 
frequent and voluminous information being disclosed.  However, such re-
porting may be of dubious value to stakeholders.  The 2016 Carrots & 
                                                 
 
76 Ten percent of the Global 250 companies use integrated reporting. Id.  
77 BARTELS ET AL., supra note 57, at 19.  
78 KING & BARTELS, supra note 66, at 42.  
79 Id. Such percentage has declined since 2013, when KPMG reported that 81% of Global 
250 companies used the frameworks. Id. This was attributed to the complexity of changes 
to the frameworks that were introduced and the movement towards incorporating non-
financial reporting in annual reports and use of integrated reporting. Id.  
80 BARTELS ET AL., supra note 57, at 25.  
81 Id.  
82 Sustainability Reporting Standards, supra note 11.   
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Sticks Report noted that the growth of sustainability reporting has resulted 
in “a rapidly growing, increasingly complex and fragmented landscape of 
reporting instruments.”83  The authors called for “[a]lignment and harmo-
nization [to] be a key goal for governments, market regulators, stock ex-
changes, industry associations, standard setters and all [others] responsible 
for developing reporting instruments.”84  Such an effort “will require in-
creased levels of collaboration and joint commitments” among entities de-
veloping reporting instruments, as well as among organizations that en-
gage in such reporting.85  The authors also advocated for steps to be taken 
“to prioritize and focus on the topics that are most relevant and material 
to the creation of long-term value both for businesses and their sharehold-
ers, and for society as a whole.”86  Taking such steps will be challenging 
given the competing call for increased transparency by companies and ever 
more comprehensive non-financial reporting.87  This author notes that the 
current situation has led to ambiguity about the content of CSR, which 
has created problems for governments seeking to mandate non-financial 
reporting.    
While CSR reporting has increased significantly in recent years, 
there are numerous open questions surrounding such disclosure.  It is un-
clear whether mandating such disclosure will in fact result in not just more 
but better reporting.  Also unclear is whether the absence of a consensus 
around a reporting format and applicable standards will compromise the 
provision of consistent and comparable information that investors and 
other stakeholders may prefer.  Perhaps the most important unanswered 
question is the following:  How effective will the various mandates and 
reporting instruments prove to be in providing quality information to in-
vestors and other stakeholders that meets their demands for transparency 
and accountability and brings us closer to a sustainable world economy?  
                                                 
 
83 BARTELS ET AL., supra note 57, at 22.  
84 Id. at 3. 
85 Id. at 22.  
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
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Section III below addresses some of these issues in the context of the 2014 
EU Directive and its implementation by Member States. 
III.     2014 EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE ON NON-FINANCIAL  
REPORTING 
A. Requirements of the 2014 EU Directive  
This Section III.A examines the mandate of non-financial report-
ing set forth in the 2014 EU Directive, revealing several features that make 
it a weak regulatory instrument due to its limited coverage of enterprises, 
the flexibility given to companies to design their own disclosure approach, 
the lack of specific guidance on the content and framework of such re-
ports, and the failure to set forth strong standards for third party assur-
ances and enforcement. 
European companies have long been leaders in CSR reporting.  
Such companies have historically reported on CSR matters at a higher rate 
than businesses in other parts of the world.88  Although the Asia Pacific 
region has recently pulled ahead of them in terms of percentage of report-
ing companies, Europe still is in the forefront of non-financial reporting 
by business enterprises.89   
This phenomenon is fueled in part by the fact that several Member 
States of the EU have taken steps in recent years to mandate such report-
ing.  This trend has accelerated as a result of the 2014 EU Directive.  Pur-
suant to such Directive, Member States of the EU were required to enact 
laws requiring disclosure of non-financial information by certain large un-
dertakings and groups by December 6, 2016.90  Such requirements will 
                                                 
 
88 KING & BARTELS, supra note 66, at 31.   
89 Id. (discussing the growth in corporate responsibility reporting in Asia Pacific over the 
West). In 2015, 79% of Asian companies produced corporate social reports in compari-
son to 74% of European companies. Id. 
90  2014 EU Directive, supra note 12, at art. 4, ¶ 1 (discussing “Transposition”). 
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become effective for fiscal years beginning on January 1, 2017, or during 
calendar year 2017.91  
The 2014 EU Directive, which amends EU Directive 
2013/34/EU on annual financial statements, consolidated financial state-
ments and related reports (“2013 EU Accounting Directive”), applies only 
to large public-interest entities (“PIEs”) with more than 500 employees 
(“covered PIE”).92  It also applies to large groups, of which a PIE is the 
parent entity, that meet the criterion of more than 500 employees on a 
consolidated basis.93  The European Commission estimates that the new 
reporting requirements will apply to approximately 6000 entities and 
groups across the EU.94   
The concept of PIEs is defined in Article 2 of the 2013 EU Ac-
counting Directive, and includes companies listed in EU markets, as well 
as some unlisted companies, such as credit institutions, insurance compa-
nies, and other companies that are so designated by Member States be-
cause of their activities, size or number of employees.95 The required non-
financial disclosure shall be incorporated in the PIE’s annual report.96  
However, if a covered PIE prepares a standalone CSR report for the same 
financial year that covers the topics required under the 2014 EU Directive, 
a Member State may exempt it from the requirement of including such 
                                                 
 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at art. 1, ¶ 1 (discussing “Non-financial statement” in new Article 19a, ¶ 1). 
93 Id. at art. 1, ¶ 3 (discussing “Consolidated non-financial statement” in new Article 29a, 
¶ 1). 
94 European Commission Press Release Statement/14/291, Disclosure of Non-financial 
Information: Europe’s Largest Companies to Be More Transparent on Social and Envi-
ronmental Issues (Sept. 29, 2014). 
95 Directive 2013/34/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 Amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and Repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC 2013 EU Accounting 
Directive On the Annual Financial statements, Consolidated Financial Statements and 
Related Reports of Certain Types of Undertakings, 2013 O.J. L182/19, at art. 2, ¶ 1 (dis-
cussing “Definitions”) [hereinafter 2013 EU Directive]. 
96 2014 EU Directive, supra note 12, at art.1, ¶ 1 (discussing “Non-financial statement” 
in new Article 19a, ¶ 1). 
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information in its annual report as long as it publishes such information 
along with the annual report or makes it available on the PIE’s website 
within a reasonable time period and refers to it in the annual report.97 This 
provision reflects the flexible approach towards disclosure embodied in 
the 2014 EU Directive in that companies who already prepare separate 
CSR reports based on national, international or European frameworks 
may continue to do so without having to change their reporting practices 
and duplicate such information in the annual report.  This provision gives 
companies the flexibility to disclose non-financial information in one of 
two ways:  either in a format that will be integrated with the annual report 
or in a separate standalone sustainability report. 
If a covered PIE is a parent of a large group exceeding on a con-
solidated basis the required number of 500 employees, it shall include a 
consolidated non-financial statement covering the required information 
for the entire group.98  However, if such parent prepares a standalone CSR 
report for the same financial year that covers the topics required under 
2014 EU Directive, a Member State may exempt it from the requirement 
of including such information in its consolidated annual report as long as 
it publishes such information along with the consolidated annual report 
or makes it available on the PIE’s website within a reasonable time period 
and refers to it in the consolidated annual report.99  A subsidiary falling 
within the definition of a PIE that is part of a group does not need to file 
its own non-financial report if it is covered by a consolidated report filed 
by its parent.100 
The 2014 EU Directive requires disclosure of non-financial infor-
mation “to the extent necessary for an understanding of the undertaking’s 
                                                 
 
97 Id. at art.1, ¶ 1 (discussing “Non-financial statement” in new Article 19a, ¶ 4). 
98 Id. at art. 1, ¶ 3 (discussing “Consolidated non-financial statement” in new Article 29a, 
¶ 1). 
99 Id. at art. 1, ¶ 3 (discussing “Consolidated non-financial statement” in new Article 29a, 
¶ 4). 
100 Id. at art.1, ¶ 1 (discussing “Non-financial statement” in new Article 19a, ¶ 3). 
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development, performance, position and impact of its activity.”101  The 
2014 EU Directive states that “at a minimum” four categories of infor-
mation must be covered, namely “environmental, social and employee 
matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters.”102  
These are the four areas that are most frequently the focus of CSR initia-
tives such as the U.N. Global Compact, as noted in Section II above.   
In addition to requiring non-financial disclosure in at least these 
four categories, the 2014 EU Directive also requires covered companies 
to report on the diversity policies for their administrative, management, 
and supervisory bodies, regarding such factors as “age, gender, or educa-
tional and professional backgrounds.”103  The objectives, implementation, 
and results for the reporting period of such policies must be included.104  
Diversity policies are placed in a disclosure category separate and apart 
from non-financial information under the 2014 EU Directive.105  In addi-
tion, the policy goals of requiring such disclosure are different than the 
policy goals of requiring non-financial information disclosure.  The stated 
policy goal for non-financial information disclosure in the 2014 EU di-
rective is “managing change towards a sustainable global economy by 
combining long-term profitability with social justice and environmental 
protection” by “measuring, monitoring and managing of undertakings’ 
performance and their impact on society.” 106  The stated policy goal for 
disclosure of diversity policies in the 2014 EU Directive is to contribute 
“effective oversight of the management and to successful governance of 
                                                 
 
101 2014 EU Directive, supra note 12, at art.1, ¶ 1 (discussing “Non-financial statement” 
in new Article 19a, ¶ 1). 
102 Id. at art.1, ¶ 1 (discussing “Non-financial statement” in new Article 19a, ¶ 1). 
103 Id. at art. 1, ¶ 2 (discussing amendments to Article 20 of 2013 EU Directive). 
104 Id. at art. 1, ¶ 1 (discussing “Non-financial statement” under the new Article 19a, ¶ 1). 
105 Non-financial disclosure is covered under new Article 19a of the 2013 EU Directive 
relating to the non-financial information contents of the management or annual report, 
while diversity policies are covered under an amendment to Article 20 of the 2013 EU 
Directive relating to that corporate governance statement in the management or annual 
report.  Id. at art. 1, ¶¶ 1, 3. 
1062014 EU Directive, supra note 12, at preamble, recital 3. 
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the undertaking” by introducing a wider variety of skills and viewpoints 
into management decision-making.107  Because there is no clear connec-
tion between these two disclosure categories, disclosure of diversity poli-
cies will not be discussed further. 
The 2014 EU Directive appears to give great latitude to the Mem-
ber States on the content of non-financial disclosures.  This conclusion 
may be drawn because the 2014 EU Directive does not spell out the con-
tent of such disclosure categories in the operative language.  Rather, in the 
Directive’s preamble, there is a list of topics that either “should,” “may,” 
or “could” be disclosed for the first four categories.  For environmental 
matters, the report “should contain . . . details of the current and foreseeable 
impacts of the undertaking’s operations on the environment, and, as ap-
propriate, on health and safety, the use of renewable and/or non-renewa-
ble energy, greenhouse gas emissions, water use and air pollution.”108  But 
for social and employee-related matters, the report: 
[M]ay concern the actions taken to ensure 
gender equality, implementation of funda-
mental conventions of the International 
Labour Organisation, working conditions, 
social dialogue, respect for the right of 
workers to be informed and consulted, re-
spect for trade union rights, health and 
safety at work and the dialogue with local 
communities, and/or the actions taken to 
ensure the protection and the development 
of those communities.109 
                                                 
 
107 Id. at preamble, recital 18 
108 Id. at preamble, recital 7 (emphasis added).  
109 Id. (emphasis added).  
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Finally, for human rights, anti-corruption, and anti-bribery matters, the 
report “could include information on the prevention of human rights 
abuses and/or on instruments in place to fight corruption and bribery.”110 
Moreover, the 2014 EU Directive adopts a “comply or explain” 
approach to disclosure, meaning that companies are required to report 
only on issues that are covered by their policies.111  If a company does not 
pursue a policy on a particular issue mandated by the 2014 EU Directive, 
it does not need to adopt a policy to be in compliance.  It must, however, 
give a “clear and reasoned explanation” for why it has no policy in place.112  
This approach gives companies free rein to design their own approaches 
to non-financial reporting and to their CSR policies, subject to the require-
ment that they provide a reason for doing so.  
There are no guidelines in the 2014 EU Directive for the format 
that reports should follow.  However, the following elements must be re-
ported in a company’s report: “a brief description of [its] business model;” 
its policies regarding the matters covered by its non-financial reporting, 
including its due diligence processes; “the outcomes of [such] policies;” 
the principal risks associated with its operations in the areas covered by 
such reporting, including “its business relationships, products or services 
which are likely to cause adverse impacts . . . and how the [company] man-
ages [such] risks;” and the “non-financial key performance indicators rel-
evant [for] the particular business.”113 
In terms of third party assurances, non-financial information inte-
grated in a management report will be required to be audited by the com-
pany’s auditors.114  Standalone sustainability reports are not required to be 
                                                 
 
110 Id. (emphasis added). 
111 2014 EU Directive, supra note 12. 
112 Id. at art. 1, ¶ 1 (discussing “Non-financial statement” in new Article 19a, ¶ 1). 
113 Id. at art. 1, ¶ 1 (discussing “Non-financial statement” in new Article 19a, ¶ 1). 
114 Id. at art. 1, ¶ 1 (discussing “Non-financial statement” in new Article 19a, ¶ 5). 
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subject to third party assurances although individual Member States may 
decide to impose such a requirement.115 
Regarding enforcement, the 2014 EU Directive states in the pre-
amble that Member States should ensure that national procedures are in 
place to enforce compliance with the reporting mandate by “all persons 
and legal entities having a legitimate interest” in such requirements.116   
However, such Directive does not set forth details on the types of en-
forcement measures that should be employed nor are minimum penalty 
requirements mandated. 
The 2014 EU Directive takes a minimum harmonization approach 
to the reporting standards that can be used for non-financial disclosures. 
It does not contain detailed rules for the content of non-financial report-
ing and does not impose mandatory EU standards.  It also does not require 
that companies use any particular CSR framework as the basis for their 
reporting.  Instead, companies may choose to present such disclosures in 
the way they consider most useful.117  They may rely on national frame-
works, EU frameworks such as the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS), or international frameworks such as the U.N. Global Compact, 
the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises, the International Organization for 
Standardization’s ISO 26000, the International Labour Organization’s Tri-
partite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy, the GRI frameworks, or other recognized international 
frameworks.118  
                                                 
 
115 Id. (discussing “Non-financial statement” in new Article 19a, ¶ 6). 
116 Id. at preamble, recital 10. 
117 European Commission Consultation Document (EC) on Non-Binding Guidelines for 
Reporting of Non-Financial Information by Companies at 4, http://ec.europa.eu/fi-
nance/consultations/2016/non-financial-reporting-guidelines/ docs/consultation-doc-
ument_en.pdf. [hereinafter European Commission Consultation Document].  
118 2014 EU Directive, supra note 12, at preamble, recital 9; see also European Commission 
Consultation Document, supra note 117, at 4 (“Companies may also consider the sectorial 
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The minimum harmonization approach will probably result in 
companies using very different formats in their reporting, which will result 
in wide variations in quantity and quality of reporting.  This will likely make 
it difficult for the users of these reports to make meaningful comparisons 
across companies.  To mitigate this problem as well as to facilitate the 
disclosure of non-financial information by companies, the 2014 EU Di-
rective required the European Commission to prepare “non-binding 
guidelines on methodology for reporting non-financial information, in-
cluding non-financial key performance indicators, general and sectoral, 
with a view to facilitating relevant, useful and comparable disclosure of 
non-financial information by undertakings” by December 6, 2016.119  The 
European Commission conducted a public consultation that ended on 
April 15, 2016, in which it solicited views from stakeholders on the form 
that such guidance should take.120  The topics covered in the consultation 
document included general principles and key attributes of non-financial 
information that should be addressed, such as materiality, comparability 
and comprehensiveness, whether the content should consist of general 
principles or detailed guidelines addressing specific sectoral issues, 
whether key performance indicators should be provided or left to the dis-
cretion of companies, whether the guidelines should relate to existing na-
tional, international or EU frameworks, and whether more clarity is 
needed on reporting of diversity information.121   
Although the 2014 EU Directive required action by December 6, 
2016, the European Commission did not issue such non-binding guidance 
until July 5, 2017.  In its communication entitled “Guidelines on Non-
                                                 
 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Con-
flict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, as appropriate.”). 
119 2014 EU Directive, supra note 12, at art. 2 (discussing “Guidance on reporting”). 
120 See European Commission Consultation Document, supra note 117; see also European 
Commission Press Release Statement, European Commission Consults on Non-Binding Guide-
lines on Disclosure of Non-Financial Information by Certain Large Companies (Jan. 15, 2016), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/midday-express-15-01-2016.htm?locale=en#5). 
121European Commission Consultation Document, supra note 117.  
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Financial Reporting (Methodology for Reporting Non-Financial Infor-
mation)” (“2017 NFR Guidelines”), the European Commission addressed 
the key principles, the content, and the reporting framework for non-fi-
nancial reporting under the 2014 EU Directive in the context of manage-
ment reports of EU companies.122   
Regarding key principles, the 2017 NFR Guidelines listed (1) dis-
closure of material information, defined to mean “information where its 
omission or misstatement could reasonably be expected to influence deci-
sions that users make on the basis of the financial statements of the un-
dertaking;” (2) fair, balanced, and understandable reporting; (3) compre-
hensive yet concise disclosure encompassing at least “environmental, so-
cial and employee matters, respect for human rights, and anti-corruption 
and bribery matters;” (4) strategic and forward-looking disclosure of the 
company’s business model, strategy and its implementation, and short-
term, medium-term, and long-term implications of the information; (5) 
stakeholder orientation addressed to “investors, workers, consumers, sup-
pliers, customers, local communities, public authorities, vulnerable 
groups, social partners and civil society;”  and (6) non-financial reporting 
that is clearly linked with and forms a coherent whole with other elements 
of the management report, with content that is consistent over time to 
allow comparability among time periods, and is consistent in its choice of 
key performance indicators.123   
Regarding content, the 2017 NFR Guidelines listed examples of 
material information to be included in non-financial reporting and man-
agement reports in each of the categories mandated by the 2014 EU Di-
rective. These categories included (1) “a brief description of the undertak-
ing’s business model;” (2) “a description of the policies pursued by the 
undertaking in relation to those matters, including due diligence processes 
                                                 
 
122 See Communication from the European Commission (EC), Guidelines on Non-Fi-
nancial Reporting (Methodology for Reporting Non-Financial Information), 60/2017 of 
5 July 2017, 2017 O.J. (C 215) [hereinafter 2017 NFR Guidelines]. 
123 Id. § 3. 
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implemented;” (3) “the outcome of [such] policies;” (4) relevant risks re-
lating to business operations in these areas and how such risks are man-
aged; (5) non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the busi-
ness; and (6) thematic aspects of the minimum content areas of non-fi-
nancial information mandated by the 2014 EU Directive, namely environ-
mental, social, and employee matters, respect for human rights, and anti-
corruption and anti-bribery matters.124  For each of these content areas, 
the 2017 NFR Guidelines provide examples of material information that 
companies could consider disclosing, along with related key performance 
indicators.125 
Regarding reporting frameworks, the 2017 NFR Guidelines re-
state language from the 2014 EU Directive giving companies the flexibility 
to use “high quality, broadly recognised national, EU-based or interna-
tional frameworks . . . .”126 Such Guidelines set forth examples of EU-
based frameworks such as the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS) and international frameworks such as the U.N. Global Compact, 
the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises, the International Organization for 
Standardization’s ISO 26000, the International Labour Organization’s Tri-
partite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy, and the GRI frameworks, and also refers to a list of some 
twenty frameworks set forth at the beginning of the Guidelines.127  The 
2017 NFR Guidelines do not prioritize these frameworks or provide any 
guidance on which, if any, of these reporting frameworks is recommended.  
In fact, the Guidelines note that the list provided is not exhaustive and 
there may be additional frameworks that can be used for non-financial 
                                                 
 
124 Id. § 4. 
125 Id. §§ 3.2, 4.5. 
126 Id. § 5. 
127 2017 NFR Guidelines, supra note 122, § 5.  
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reporting. The Guidelines suggest that, for purposes of “clarity and com-
parability,” a company relying on one or several of these frameworks 
should disclose which frameworks it has used for specific disclosures.128 
While the 2017 NFR Guidelines provide some additional guidance 
on the non-financial reporting mandate set forth in the 2014 EU Directive, 
they fail to provide clear guidance on the contents and reporting frame-
work that will be most informative to stakeholders seeking to utilize such 
non-financial information. As a result, they fail to address the concern that 
the 2014 EU Directive does not facilitate comparability and consistency 
in non-financial reporting across the EU companies covered by the Di-
rective. 
B. Policy Objectives and Historical Development of the 2014 EU Directive  
This Section III.B explores the development of EU policy and leg-
islation on non-financial reporting that resulted in the adoption of the 
2014 EU Directive.  Through a series of steps taken over the time period 
from 2001 through 2014, the European Commission articulated a clear 
vision for enhanced transparency on CSR and an increasingly detailed 
agenda for achieving that result.   Such agenda sought to engage the busi-
ness community by emphasizing the benefits projected to result from non-
financial reporting and situating companies at the center of the disclosure 
process, while carving out a new but somewhat limited role for govern-
ment regulation.  The resulting “smart mix approach” allows both the 
public and the private sectors to play a role and thus is an improvement 
over a purely voluntary approach to non-financial reporting.  However, 
reluctance on the part of the business community to accept stronger stand-
ards for such reporting may hinder the policy objectives of the 2014 EU 
Directive from being achieved in the near term.  
The policy goal of the 2014 EU Directive was to introduce greater 
information transparency in non-financial matters by EU companies.  The 
EU has touted the economic benefits of this policy, namely the belief that 
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companies, investors, and society at large will benefit from increased trans-
parency because it leads to stronger long-term performance, which is im-
portant for Europe’s long-term competitiveness and the creation of 
jobs.129 It is the latest step taken towards this goal by the EU in what ap-
pears to be an evolutionary process with its origins in the early 1990s.130  
However, the 2014 EU Directive must be viewed only as an intermediate 
step that will require further refinement if the policy goal is to be achieved.   
In tracing the history of the development of non-financial report-
ing in the EU, four major policy themes emerge:  (1) the value of non-
financial information transparency and the potential benefits it offers to 
business; (2) the importance of key stakeholder engagement with CSR is-
sues, including with consumers, employees, and investors; (3) the emer-
gence of a role for government regulation that complements voluntary 
initiatives by business; and (4) the need for convergence around a common 
set of reporting standards.  These themes have been repeated in both leg-
islative enactments and policy statements issued by various EU institu-
tions. 
 Starting with the 2014 EU Directive, such Directive states its pri-
mary policy objective as improving the “transparency of the social and 
environmental information provided by undertakings in all sectors.”131  
The Directive notes that this is a “continuous endeavour,” recognizing 
that improving transparency may be a process that takes place through a 
series of steps over time.132  Other policy objectives mentioned in the lan-
                                                 
 
129 European Commission Consultation Survey (EC), Public Consultation on Non-Bind-
ing Guidelines on Methodology for Reporting Non-financial Information (Apr. 14, 
2016), http://www.eumedion.nl/en/public/knowledgenetwork/consultations/2016-
04-eusurvey---non-binding-non-financial-information-guidelines.pdf. 
130 See European Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001), http://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52001DC0366&from=EN [hereinafter 2001 Green 
Paper]; see also Kinderman, supra note 20, at 716. 
131 2014 EU Directive, supra note 12, at preamble, recital 1. 
132 Id. 
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guage of the Directive include enhancing “the consistency and compara-
bility of non-financial information disclosed throughout the Union”133 and 
“coordination of national provisions concerning the disclosure of non-
financial information in respect of certain large undertakings . . . [which] 
is necessary . . . because most of those undertakings operate in more than 
one Member State.”134 
The rationales for seeking to promote improved transparency set 
forth in the 2014 EU Directive include “identifying sustainability risks,” 
“increasing investor and consumer trust,” and “managing change towards 
a sustainable global economy by combining long-term profitability with 
social justice and environmental protection.”135  Disclosure is said to help 
“the measuring, monitoring and managing of undertakings’ performance 
and their impact on society.”136 
Looking further back in time, the 2001 Green Paper on Promoting 
a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility (“2001 Green 
Paper”) represented the European Commission’s first attempt to develop 
a CSR policy for the EU.137  The purpose of the 2001 Green Paper was to 
promote a discussion on advancing CSR in Europe and on the interna-
tional level, with a focus on innovation, transparency, and deepening part-
nerships with stakeholders.138   
In the 2001 Green Paper, the European Commission sets forth 
several fundamental principles underlying CSR, including a definition of 
CSR that reads as follows:  “a concept whereby companies integrate social 
and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their in-
teraction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.”139  The 2001 Green 
                                                 
 
133 Id. at preamble, recital 6. 
134 Id. at preamble, recital 4. 
135 Id. at preamble, recital 3. 
136 Id. 
137 See 2001 Green Paper, supra note 130.  
138 Id. at 3 (discussing “Executive Summary” at ¶ 7). 
139 Id. at 6 (discussing “What is corporate social responsibility?” at ¶ 20). 
656          TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW          [Vol. 19 
 
Paper stated that CSR meant “going beyond compliance and investing 
‘more’ into human capital, the environment and the relations with stake-
holders.”140   
The 2001 Green Paper emphasized the “business case” for CSR 
broadly defined.141  It explicitly linked CSR with the notion of sustainable 
business practices and thus focused on a long-term strategy connecting 
economic growth, social cohesion, and environmental protection.142  It 
identified both direct and indirect economic benefits that flowed from 
CSR and produced “better performance” and “more profits and 
growth.”143  These included a better working environment leading to a 
more productive work force, more efficient use of natural resources, and 
more attention from consumers and investors leading to increased market 
opportunities.144 
In addition to setting forth a definition and supporting principles 
for CSR, the 2001 Green Paper discussed trends in CSR that were current 
at the time, including the development of CSR reporting in Europe.  On 
that topic, the Green Paper noted that while it is businesses that must 
become socially responsible, other stakeholders including employees, con-
sumers, and investors can prompt business to adopt responsible prac-
tices.145  Transparency about the social and environmental performance of 
business is key to that process.146 
                                                 
 
140 Id. at 6 (discussing “What is corporate social responsibility?” at ¶ 21). 
141 Id. at 4, 22. The business case for CSR is discussed supra Section II. David Vogel has 
noted that a belief in the business benefits of CSR is particularly influential in Europe.  
Vogel, Is There a Market for Virtue?, supra note 33. 
142 2001 Green Paper, supra note 130, at 4 (discussing “Introduction” at ¶ 9). 
143 Id. at 7 (discussing “What is corporate social responsibility?” at ¶ 24). 
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 15 (discussing “A holistic approach towards corporate social responsibility” at ¶ 
62). 
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The 2001 Green Paper noted some of the problems associated 
with existing CSR reporting, especially lack of consistency in content, re-
porting format, and use of reliability and audit standards.147  It described 
the proliferation of public and private initiatives in support of social and 
environmental reporting that had been taken at the national and interna-
tional level, and the wide variety of approaches and lack of coherence 
among such standards.148  However, it noted the emergence of the GRI 
Guidelines as evidence of best practices on the environmental side.149  
In an attempt to engage stakeholders, the 2001 Green Paper 
launched a public consultation process ending on December 31, 2001, in 
which the European Commission posed eighteen questions on which it 
sought stakeholder input.150  The results of the consultation were an-
nounced in a 2002 European Commission communication entitled “Cor-
porate Social Responsibility: A business contribution to Sustainable De-
velopment” (“2002 EC Communication”).151  Such communication set 
forth a “European Action Framework for CSR,” which included “facili-
tating convergence and transparency of CSR practices and tools.”152  The 
European Commission once again noted the proliferation of CSR initia-
tives, which differed in scope and applicability to various businesses, sec-
tors or industries, and their inability to meet the needs for transparency of 
business performance.153  For that reason, the 2002 EC Communication 
called for “a certain convergence of concepts, instruments, practices, 
which would increase transparency without stifling innovation, and would 
                                                 
 
147 2001 Green Paper, supra note 130, at 16 (discussing “Social responsibility reporting 
and auditing” at ¶ 66). 
148 Id. at 17 (discussing “Social responsibility reporting and auditing” at ¶ 71). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 21–23 (discussing “The consultation process” at ¶ 92). 
151 European Commission Communication on Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business Contribu-
tion to Sustainable Development, COM (2002) 347 final (July 2, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 EC 
Communication]. 
152 Id. at 5, 8. 
153 Id. at 13. 
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offer benefits to all parties . . . [and] build upon core values and take their 
starting point in international agreed instruments . . . .”154 
Another important feature of the 2002 EC Communication was 
the establishment of an EU multi-stakeholder forum on CSR (“EMS Fo-
rum”).155  The purpose of the EMS Forum, which was launched on Octo-
ber 16, 2002, was to facilitate dialogue among businesses and their stake-
holders, including employers, employees, consumers, and civil society, as 
well as professional associations and business networks, with the aim of 
“promoting transparency and convergence of CSR practices and instru-
ments.”156  The EMS Forum issued a final report in June 2004.157  After 
that date, it continued to meet and work on CSR issues on several occa-
sions.158 
In a later European Commission Communication from 2006 en-
titled “Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs:  Making Eu-
rope a Pole of Excellence on Corporate Social Responsibility” (“2006 EC 
Communication”), the European Commission noted that progress had 
been made on awareness, understanding, and uptake of CSR as a result of 
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155 Id. at 17. 
156 2002 EC Communication, supra note 151, at 17.  
157 European Commission Communication on Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: 
Making Europe a Pole of Excellence on Corporate Social Responsibility, at 3, COM (2006) 136 
final (Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 EC Communication]. 
158 EU Multi Stakeholder Forum on CSR: Next Steps, EURACTIV (Jan. 12, 2003), 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/eu-multi-stakeholder-fo-
rum-on-csr-next-steps/; Executive Summary: EU Multi Stakeholder Forum on Corporate Social 
Responsibility, (Feb. 3–4, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/ 8774/at-
tachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native. 
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the EMS Forum, including a consensus that arose around the Commis-
sion’s definition of CSR.159  However, no consensus was achieved on top-
ics such as company reporting requirements and the need for a European 
standard for CSR.160   
The European Commission acknowledged that more involvement 
by business was needed and invited enterprises to strengthen their com-
mitment to CSR by joining a newly instituted “European Alliance for 
CSR.”161  The European Commission described this initiative as a “part-
nership” built on the understanding that CSR can contribute to sustainable 
development and enhance European business innovation and competi-
tiveness, all of which will lead to economic growth and job creation.162  In 
such a partnership, business was to take the lead and the role of the Eu-
ropean Commission was to play a supporting or facilitating role by pro-
moting the voluntary and innovative CSR practices of business and by 
encouraging and disseminating good practices.163  One commentator has 
interpreted the creation of the European Alliance for CSR as a move by 
the European Commission “to outsource policy on CSR to business.”164  
The key areas for EU action announced in the 2006 EC Communication 
included “[a]wareness-raising and best practice exchange,” “[s]upport to 
multi-stakeholder initiatives,” “[c]ooperation with Member States,” 
“[c]onsumer information and transparency,” “[r]esearch,” “[e]ducation,” 
small and medium-sized enterprises (‘SMEs’), and “[t]he international di-
mension of CSR.”165 
                                                 
 
159 2006 EC Communication, supra note 157, at 3. 
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161 Id. at 3. 
162 European Commission Press Release IP/06/358, Launch of “European Alliance for 
Corporate Social Responsibility” (Mar. 22, 2006), at 4. 
163 Id. at 6. 
164 Kinderman, supra note 20, at 716. 
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In terms of EU legislative action, the first mention of non-finan-
cial reporting was in the 2003 Accounts Modernization Directive, EU  Di-
rective 2003/51/EC (“2003 EU Directive”), which required enterprises  
to disclose in their annual reports “[t]o the extent necessary for an under-
standing of the company's development, performance or position, . . . 
both financial and, where appropriate, non-financial key performance in-
dicators relevant to the particular business, including information relating 
to environmental and employee matters.”166  In addition, such Directive 
contained language that allowed Member States to exempt SMEs from 
such non-financial reporting requirement, and all Member States have 
chosen to do so.167  Due to its conditional language (“to the extent neces-
sary” and “where appropriate”), the 2003 EU Directive cannot be viewed 
as containing a mandate for non-financial reporting.  The carve-out for 
SMEs also limited the effectiveness of the 2003 EU Directive in promot-
ing enhanced non-financial reporting. 
The 2003 EU Directive remained the only legislation on non-fi-
nancial reporting that was in place until adoption of the 2014 EU Di-
rective.  The 2014 EU Directive was the culmination of a series of addi-
tional steps taken by EU institutions to refine CSR principles, including 
those relating to non-financial reporting. 
In 2011, the European Commission announced the development 
of a renewed strategy for CSR in a communication entitled “A renewed 
EU strategy 2011-2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility” (“2011 CSR 
                                                 
 
166 Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 
2003 amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC 
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pany Law Directive), 2003 O.J. L 178/18, at art. 1, ¶ 14(a), (b) [hereinafter 2003 EU 
Directive].  
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Commission Communication on A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, 
at 11 fn. 21, COM (2011) 681 final (Oct. 25, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 CSR Strategy]. 
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Strategy”).168  The European Commission had been requested to take ac-
tion by the European Council and the European Parliament to further 
develop CSR policy.169  Although the European Commission acknowl-
edged some progress on CSR issues since the publication of the 2001 
Green Paper, it also recognized that “important challenges remain[ed]”.170  
These included failure of European companies to integrate “social and 
environmental concerns into their operations and core strateg[ies],” and 
lack of adoption of national CSR policy frameworks by nearly half of EU 
Member States.171  Once again, the European Commission emphasized 
the “business case” for CSR, speaking of the benefits that a “strategic ap-
proach to CSR” could bring to the competitiveness of enterprises “in 
terms of risk management, cost savings, access to capital, customer rela-
tionships, human resource management, and innovation capacity.”172  
Two significant changes to EU CSR policy emerged from the 2011 
CSR Strategy.  First, it redefined CSR as “the responsibility of enterprises 
for their impacts on society.”173  This is a broadening of the earlier defini-
tion, which referred only to environmental and employee issues and used 
tentative language about company non-financial disclosure (“to the extent 
necessary”), which could be understood to allow companies to integrate 
such issues in business operations on a voluntary basis.  Under the revised 
definition, enterprises are now to be held responsible for all of their im-
pacts.  In order to fulfill such responsibilities, businesses will need to have 
                                                 
 
168 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 167, at 4.  
169 Id. (citing European Council and European Parliament action in Environment Council 
5 Dec. 2008, Environment Council 20 Dec. 2010, Foreign Affairs Council 14 June 2010, 
European Parliament Resolution 13 Mar. 2007 (P6_TA(2007)0062), European Parlia-
ment Resolution 8 June 2011 P7_TA(2011)0260). 
170 Id. at 5. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 3. 
173 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 167, at 6. 
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a process for integrating CSR into their business operations and core strat-
egies.174   
A second significant change was the role assigned to government 
in CSR.  Rather than referring to CSR as a voluntary initiative on the part 
of business, which was the traditional view of CSR, the 2011 CSR Strategy 
stated that government should play a supporting role through “a smart 
mix of voluntary policy measures and, where necessary, complementary 
regulation, for example to promote transparency, create market incentives 
for responsible business conduct, and ensure corporate accountability.”175  
The mention of use of regulation to promote transparency foreshadowed 
the non-financial reporting requirements of the 2014 EU Directive. 
The 2011 CSR Strategy set forth an eight point action agenda, 
which included enhancing the visibility of CSR and disseminating good 
practices; improving and tracking levels of trust in business; improving 
self-regulation and co-regulation processes such as codes of conduct; 
strengthening market incentives for CSR; improving company disclosure 
of social and environmental information; further integrating CSR into ed-
ucation, training, and research; emphasizing the importance of national 
and sub-national CSR policies; and better aligning European and global 
approaches to CSR.176 
The fifth action item on the eight point agenda, namely improving 
company disclosure of social and environmental information, revealed the 
European Commission’s concern with the fact that only a small percent-
age of European companies, approximately 2,500 out of a total of 42,000 
                                                 
 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 7.  “Enterprises must be given the flexibility to innovate and to develop an 
approach to CSR that is appropriate to their circumstances. Many enterprises neverthe-
less value the existence of principles and guidelines that are supported by public author-
ities, to benchmark their own policies and performance, and to promote a more level 
playing field.” Id. 
176 Id. at 8–15. 
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large companies operating in the EU, published CSR reports.177  The Eu-
ropean Commission also noted its concern with differences among na-
tional standards on non-financial disclosure that could create additional 
costs for enterprises operating in more than one Member State.178  The 
2011 CSR Strategy envisioned preparation of a legislative proposal on the 
transparency of the social and environmental information provided by 
companies in all sectors.179 
As a result of the 2011 CSR Strategy, the EU adopted stronger 
non-financial reporting requirements in the 2014 EU Directive.  As de-
tailed in the 2013 European Commission proposal for a new directive to 
improve the transparency of social and environmental information by EU 
companies (“2013 EU Proposal”), the EU took a series of steps in devel-
oping such proposal, consisting of careful analysis of the issues in-
volved.180  Such steps included regular dialogue with stakeholders, includ-
ing through use of public consultations, eliciting expert group opinions, 
and meeting with stakeholders and Member States’ representatives.181  The 
European Commission also hired an external consultant to study non-fi-
nancial reporting practices based on published EU company reports and 
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of non-financial reports.182  In addition, 
the European Commission completed an impact assessment that accom-
panied the 2013 EU Proposal, in which it analyzed various policy options 
                                                 
 
177 Id. at 11. 
178 2011 CSR Strategy, supra note 167, at 11. 
179 Id. at 12. 
180 See European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Directive 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards disclosure of non-
financial and diversity information by certain large companies and groups, COM (2013) 
207 final (Apr. 16, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 EU Proposal].  
181 Id. at ¶ 2. 
182 See Final Report on the Disclosure of non-financial information by Companies, Centre 
for Strategy and Evaluation Services, (Dec. 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/ internal_mar-
ket/accounting/docs/non-financial-reporting/com_2013_207-study_en.pdf.  
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and then recommended a legislative approach (“2013 EU Impact Assess-
ment”).183 
The 2013 EU Impact Assessment, which accompanied and was 
echoed in the 2013 EU Proposal, identified the issues of inadequate trans-
parency of non-financial information and lack of board diversity.184  Re-
garding lack of transparency of non-financial information, which is the 
focus of this article, both the low quantity and the poor quality of report-
ing were noted.185  The European Commission attributed the problem to 
both market failure and regulatory failure.186  Regarding market failure, the 
European Commission noted that market incentives seemed insufficient 
because the benefits appear long-term and uncertain to market partici-
pants while the short-term costs appear high and easily quantifiable.187  Re-
garding regulatory failure, it noted that the 2003 Accounting Directive fails 
to provide a clear legal obligation, leading most companies to view non-
financial reporting as voluntary under such Directive.188  Although some 
Member States had enacted legislation that exceeded the obligations of the 
2003 Accounting Directive, such laws varied widely in content and scope, 
leading to difficulties for analysts and investors seeking to compare or 
benchmark companies across the EU.189  Such lack of transparency was 
deemed to negatively impact both the companies that prepare such infor-
mation as well as the users of such information, including investors, non-
                                                 
 
183 European Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying 
the Document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Directive 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards Disclosure of 
Non-financial and Diversity Information by Certain Large Companies and Groups, SWD 
(2013) 127 final (Apr. 16, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 EU Impact Assessment]. 
184 Id. at 8.  As mentioned previously, this article will discuss only the first issue of trans-
parency of non-financial information. 
185 Id. at 10–11. 
186 Id. at 11–12.   
187 Id.     
188 2013 EU Impact Assessment, supra note 183, at 12.   
189 Id. at 23, 38, 44. 
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governmental organizations, and public authorities.190  Negative impacts 
were noted in the areas of company performance (due to management’s 
failure to integrate non-financial risks and opportunities into business op-
erations and strategies), accountability (due to failure of companies to 
meet the non-financial information demands of civil society), and capital 
market efficiency (due to lack of integration of non-financial considera-
tions into investor decision-making processes).191 
In the 2013 EU Impact Assessment, the European Commission 
noted that, although there was non-binding guidance for non-financial re-
porting that had been developed at the international level, there was no 
global standard setter that would advance the cause of non-financial re-
porting in the short-term.192  Moreover, the principle of subsidiarity gives 
the EU the authority to act if it could achieve better results than the Mem-
ber States, subject to the proviso that its action is limited to what is neces-
sary to achieve the objectives and complies with the principle of propor-
tionality.193  Since the European Commission believed that it was prefera-
ble to legislate through EU law, it chose to take action to strengthen the 
non-financial reporting requirements for EU companies. 
The 2013 EU Impact Assessment contained a list of policy options 
to address the need for greater non-financial information disclosure.  
These included no change in existing law (Option 0); requiring a statement 
on non-financial information in the company annual report based on a set 
of minimum disclosure standards (Option 1); requiring detailed reporting 
in a standalone non-financial report prepared in accordance with interna-
tional frameworks and the use of key performance indicators (Option 2), 
either on a mandatory (Option 2a), report or explain (Option 2b), or vol-
untary basis (Option 2c); or setting up a mandatory EU reporting standard 
                                                 
 
190 Id. at 13. 
191 Id.  
192 Id. at 21.   
193 2013 EU Impact Assessment, supra note 183, at 22.   
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(Option 3).194  The 2013 EU Impact Assessment also contained a detailed 
examination of each of the policy options, including a cost-benefit analysis 
that delved into the effectiveness in increasing the quantity and quality of 
information, the efficiency or compliance cost, the impact on competitive-
ness, and the coherence with EU legislation of each of the policy op-
tions.195  The European Commission concluded, based on such analysis 
that the preferred policy option would be what it termed a “smart mix” of 
a mandatory statement in the annual report (Option 1) and a voluntary 
detailed standalone report (Option 2c).196  Under such preferred policy 
option, companies would be required to include a statement containing 
material non-financial information in their annual reports, subject to a re-
port or explain standard if they lacked a policy in any required disclosure 
area and also subject to an exemption if they prepared a detailed 
standalone report on a voluntary basis.197 
The 2013 EU Proposal and the accompanying 2013 EU Impact 
Assessment ultimately resulted in the adoption of the 2014 EU Directive 
by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.  Due 
to opposition from the business community to some of the proposed 
wording, the 2014 EU Directive differed in several respects from the 2013 
                                                 
 
194 Id. at 25–26.    
195 Id. at 27–30. 
196 Id. at 30. 
197 Id. (“Companies would be required to disclose material non-financial information in 
the form of a statement in their Annual Report. Those companies that do not have a 
specific policy in one or more topical areas would be at least required to explain why this 
is the case. For companies willing to prepare a detailed report on a voluntary basis, the 
proposed policy mix would provide an exemption from the disclosure obligation de-
scribed under Option 1, provided that: (i) the report covers the same topics and content, 
(ii) it makes reference to international frameworks, and (iii) it is included in the Annual 
Report. This provision builds on existing practices and provides a limited but useful in-
centive to improve the quality of those reports. Information would be disclosed in refer-
ence to high quality, generally accepted international frameworks, and verified for con-
sistency due to the inclusion in the Annual Report.”). 
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EU Proposal.198  The 2013 EU Proposal was drafted to cover companies 
with over 500 employees and was estimated to apply to 18,000 companies, 
but the scope of the 2014 EU Directive was narrowed to apply only to 
PIEs of over 500 employees such as public companies and financial insti-
tutions, resulting in a reduced estimate of only 6,000 covered compa-
nies.199  In addition, the 2013 EU Proposal provided that companies pub-
lishing standalone non-financial information reports incorporate such 
documents in their annual reports, while the 2014 EU Directive allows 
companies to make such information publicly available on the company 
website within a reasonable time period not to exceed six months as long 
as this is referenced in the annual report.200  Another change to the 2013 
EU Proposal was inclusion of a carve-out for sensitive information that, 
in the opinion of the company, would seriously compromise its commer-
cial position.201  Such changes weakened the 2014 EU Directive as it was 
ultimately adopted. 
C. Implementation of the 2014 EU Directive  
The 2014 EU Directive required Member States to inform the Eu-
ropean Commission of the entry into force of laws, regulations, and ad-
ministrative provisions needed to comply by December 6, 2016.202  Pur-
suant to such Directive, Member States may enact laws with higher re-
quirements, but may not choose to implement a lower level of reporting.203  
                                                 
 
198 See Daniel Kinderman, The Struggle over the EU Non-financial Disclosure Directive, 8/2015 
WSI-MITTEILUNGEN 613, 613–21 (2015), http://www.boeckler.de/wsi-mittei-
lungen_62503_62549.htm (available in English at https://ssrn.com/abstract =2614983). 
199 2013 EU Proposal, supra note 180, ¶ 1. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 2014 EU Directive, supra note 12, at art. 4, ¶ 1 (discussing “Transposition”). 
203 Id. at preamble, recital 1. The European Commission had previously identified that 
requiring this type of uniformity throughout the Member States is “fully consistent with 
the possibility for Member States to require, as appropriate, further improvements to the 
transparency of undertakings’ non-financial information.” Id. 
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In spite of the firm deadline, not all Member States submitted timely no-
tifications and not all submissions fully complied with the 2014 EU Di-
rective by such date.204 
Prior to the 2014 EU Directive, a number of Member States had 
already implemented non-financial reporting requirements.205  These juris-
dictions include France, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Fin-
land, Portugal and Sweden.206  For Member States with pre-existing laws, 
amendments to such laws were required if they did not conform to the 
minimum requirements set out in the Directive.  For Member States that 
did not require such reporting prior to 2014, new laws had to be enacted.   
According to the 2015 KPMG Report, the four European coun-
tries with the highest rates of CSR reporting in annual reports are France, 
the United Kingdom, Norway, and Denmark.207  This Section III.C will 
examine the laws relating to non-financial reporting in two of these coun-
tries, France and Denmark, as examples of the types of laws that Member 
States with a demonstrated commitment to fostering such reporting had 
put in place prior to the 2014 EU Directive.208  It also will discuss the need 
                                                 
 
204 European Commission, Non-financial reporting directive – transposition status, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/non-financial-reporting-directive-transposi-
tion-status_en.  In those cases, the 2014 EU Directive is directly applied in such Member 
States.  
205 The 28 EU Member States are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cy-
prus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Ro-
mania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK, https://europa.eu/ european-un-
ion/about-eu/countries_en?country=PL. 
206 Chris Hibbitt & David Collison, Corporate Environmental Disclosure and Reporting Develop-
ments in Europe, 24(1) SOC. AND ENVTL. ACCOUNTABILITY J. 1 (2004). 
207 KING & BARTELS, supra note 66, at 37 (discussing countries with the highest rate of 
corporate responsibility reporting in annual reports). 
208 While the United Kingdom has taken steps to promote non-financial reporting and to 
implement the 2014 EU Directive, this Section III.C will not cover United Kingdom 
legislative developments.  This is due to the fact that the United Kingdom is taking steps 
to exit the EU, so-called “Brexit.” Stephen Castle, U.K. Initiates ‘Brexit’ and Wades Into a 
Thorny Thicket, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
03/29/world/europe/brexit-uk-eu-article-50.html. For further insight into the history of 
non-financial reporting initiatives in the United Kingdom, see Cynthia A. Williams & 
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to amend such pre-existing laws in these countries in order to implement 
the 2014 EU Directive. 
The implementation case studies in these two Member States il-
lustrate three important points.  First, the development of non-financial 
reporting practices is an evolutionary process that may take years to ac-
complish as countries adapt to new and changing circumstances pertaining 
to such reporting.  Second, the trajectory of legislative developments in 
these two Member States resulted in unique national laws, yet there are 
some similarities, including maintaining a strong role for business deci-
sion-making, such as by allowing companies to “comply or explain” with 
respect to the disclosure of CSR policies (France) or to simply explain that 
no policy is in place (Denmark).  Third, even for countries that have been 
leaders in mandating such reporting through legislation, the process of 
implementing the 2014 EU Directive has required additional legislative 
changes to conform to the requirements of such Directive.  The process 
of implementation will prove even more challenging for EU Member 
States that did not have legislation in place prior to the 2014 EU Directive.   
1. France 
France has been a leader in promoting CSR reporting.  It was the 
first country in the EU to require CSR reporting for companies whose 
shares are listed on an exchange, even before the EU took steps to en-
courage non-financial reporting in 2003.209  It was also the first country to 
mandate that such reporting be included in management’s annual report 
alongside financial reporting.210   
                                                 
 
John M. Conley, Triumph or Tragedy? The Curious Path of Corporate Disclosure Reform in the 
U.K., 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317 (2007).  
209 République Française, Preparatory Document for the French National Plan for the Development 
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), 11 (2013), http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/ 
IMG/pdf/PREPARATORY_DOCMENT_FOR_THE_FRENCH_NATIONAL_ 
PLAN_FOR_THE_DEVELOPMENT_OF_CORPORATE_SOCIAL_RESPONSI-
BILITY_CSR_.pdf.  
210 Id. 
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The French law on non-financial reporting has been on the books 
since 2001 when Article 116 of Les Nouvelles Regulations Economiques 
(“NRE”), the Law on New Economic Regulations, amending Article 225-
102-1 of the French Commercial Code, was adopted (such law as amended 
hereinafter referred to as “French NFR Law”).211 Article 116 was imple-
mented through a 2002 decree of the Conseil d’Etat, the Council of State 
(“2002 Decree”).212  
The purpose of the law was to increase transparency and allow 
shareholders and other stakeholders, including rating agencies, to better 
assess company performance.213  While some of the information required 
to be disclosed was already being collected by companies, the new law 
expanded both the categories of information that needed to be addressed 
and the depth of analysis to be provided.214  Another new feature was the 
fact that such information became publicly available for the first time.  
Previously, only management, and in some cases employees in Works 
Councils, had access to the information.215  
                                                 
 
211 See Loi 2001-420 du 15 mai 2001 relative aux nouvelles régulations économiques [Law 
2001-420 of May 15, 2001 Relating to French New Economic Regulations Act], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 
15, 2001, p. 7776. 
212 Décret 2002-221 du 20 février 2002 pris pour l'application de l'article L. 225-102-1 du 
code de commerce et modifiant le décret n° 67-236 du 23 mars 1967 sur les sociétés 
commerciales [Decree 2002-221 of February 20, 2002 Taken for the Application of Ar-
ticle L. 225-102-1 of the Commercial Code and Amending Decree 67-236 of March 23, 
1967 on Commercial Companies] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Feb. 20, 2002, p. 3360.  
213 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères – France: Office of the Ambassador At Large for 
Corporate Social Responsibility, The French Legislation on Extra-Financial Reporting: Built on 
Consensus, 1 (Dec. 2012),  
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Mandatory_reporting_built_on_consen-
sus_in_France.pdf. 
214 Mary Lou Egan et al., France’s Nouvelles Regulations Economiques: Using Government Man-
dates for Corporate Reporting to Promote Environmentally Sustainable Economic Development, at 12–
13 (unpublished manuscript) (2003), http://www.bendickegan.com/pdf/ 
EganMauleonWolffBendick.pdf. 
215 Id. at 12. 
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In response to perceived deficiencies in Article 116 of the NRE 
legislation and the 2002 Decree, Article 225 of the Grenelle II Law of July 
12, 2010 was enacted.216  This law builds on the non-financial reporting 
mechanism established under the NRE by once again amending Article 
225-102-1 of the French Commercial Code.  Such provision was imple-
mented through a decree published on April 26, 2012 (“2012 Decree”).217 
An examination of the history of the French NFR Law reveals that 
non-financial reporting in France builds on a stakeholder consensus in fa-
vor of such reporting and has evolved gradually over a decade or more.  
Companies that are covered by such law include publicly listed companies 
and other large companies as defined in the legislation, namely unlisted 
companies with over 500 employees and a balance sheet total or net turn-
over exceeding EUR 100 million.  This latter category of large unlisted 
companies was added pursuant to the 2012 Decree and became effective 
after December 31, 2013. 
Such covered companies must provide certain quantitative and 
qualitative non-financial information in their annual reports.  The French 
NFR Law provides a list of required categories of disclosure that has ex-
panded over time.  Initially, the 2002 Decree implementing Article 116 of 
the NRE identified some thirty disclosure categories.218  These categories 
                                                 
 
216 Loi 2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour l'environnement 
[Law 2010-788 of July 12, 2010 on National Commitment to the Environment], JOUR-
NAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 
July 12, 2010, p. 12905, art. 225. 
217 Décret 2012-557 du 24 avril 2012 relatif aux obligations de transparence des entre-
prises en matière sociale et environnementale [Decree 2012-557 of April 24, 2012 Re-
garding the Duties of Corporate Transparency in Social and Environmental], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],  April 
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218 Décret 2002-221 du 20 février 2002 pris pour l'application de l'article L. 225-102-1 du 
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encompassed three broad areas of corporate activity, namely human re-
sources and labor standards, community involvement, and environmental 
impact, management, and protection. 219  After Article 225 of the Grenelle 
II Law was enacted, the 2012 Decree listed forty disclosure categories, 
which are divided into three areas: social information (including employ-
ment, work organization, labor relations, health and safety training, equal 
opportunity and non-discrimination; for listed companies, promotion and 
enforcement of core labor standards of the International Labour Organi-
zation), environmental information (including environmental policy, pol-
lution and waste management, sustainable usage of resources, climate 
change and protection of biodiversity), and social commitments in favor 
of sustainable development (including territorial, economic and social im-
pact of the company’s activity, relations with stakeholders such as social 
integration associations, educational institutions, environmental defense 
groups, consumer associations and the local population, use of outsourc-
ing and suppliers).220  
Even though the French NFR Law requires numerous categories 
of information to be disclosed, no specific reporting indicators are re-
quired and such disclosure categories do not correspond to any particular 
set of international CSR standards.  There is no mandated form of report-
ing, although some guidance is given on the scope of the information to 
be provided. The requirement of third party verification was added by the 
2012 Decree and now provides some assurance that company reports ac-
curately portray their operations and are not being used merely to enhance 
their public image.  As a result of a change made through the 2012 Decree, 
the French NFR Law adopts a “comply or explain approach,” meaning 
that a company may omit some of the required information if it is not 
considered relevant to its operations, but must present a rationale for such 
                                                 
 
1967 on Commercial Companies] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Feb. 20, 2002, p. 3360.  
219 Id. at art. 1 (amending 1967 Decree to add Art. 148-2), art. 2 (amending 1967 Decree 
to add Art. 148-3). 
220 2012 Decree, supra note 217.  
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omissions, which then become subject to scrutiny by the third party audi-
tor.221 
The French NFR Law does not impose sanctions for non-compli-
ance with the disclosure mandate.222  According to the French Office of 
the Ambassador at large for Corporate Social Responsibility, Article 116 
was part of a long tradition of so-called “orientation laws” being regularly 
adopted in France to set national goals with the weight of parliamentary 
decisions behind them but without any government sanctions for non-
compliance.223  It was incumbent on shareholders, who received such re-
ports at the annual meeting, to apply pressure on company management 
to comply with the law if it failed to report.224  The 2012 Decree did not 
change this aspect of the French NFR Law to require any government 
sanctions for non-compliance.225 
As a result of several of the key features of the French NFR Law, 
namely the “comply or explain” approach combined with the relative 
vagueness of the reporting standards and the lack of government sanctions 
for non-compliance, such law is considerably weaker than might appear at 
first glance.  Rather than being a strong government mandate for en-
hanced disclosure, the French NFR Law leaves much to the discretion of 
business decision makers. 
In spite of these weaknesses, some commentators believe that the 
French NFR Law has led to an increase in the quantity of non-financial 
reporting over time, although evidence of improvements in the quality of 
such reporting seems to be lacking.  Initial studies showed a low rate of 
reporting under the French NFR Law and also revealed other problems 
relating to quality, such as wide variation in the form, content, length and 
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depth of reporting, use of only qualitative analysis and no quantitative 
measures by some companies, lack of documentation of sources in some 
cases, and no third party verification comparable to that used for financial 
reporting in most cases.226  Some private sector and academic commenta-
tors attributed such flaws to lack of experience in this type of reporting, 
as well as lack of reporting standards and ambiguities in the legal require-
ments.227  The lack of sanctions was considered by these commentators to 
be a positive feature because it encouraged experimentation and creativity 
in demonstrating a high level of reporting that could be emulated by other 
companies.228 
The impact of the NRE’s Article 116 mandate was assessed by 
auditing firms and by several associations involved with CSR reporting at 
the request of the French government and presented in a 2004 report 
(“2004 Report”).229 In the 2004 Report, it was noted that there were ap-
proximately 700 companies to which the law applied, but not all were in 
compliance.  The 2004 Report also pointed out the difficulty of formulat-
ing indicators for every area of sustainability, as well as the time-consum-
ing and costly nature of such reporting.  Such Report also attributed the 
low quality of reporting to a lack of consensus on key issues, including 
how comprehensive the indicators should be, whether such reports should 
be used for internal strategic and management purposes as well as to in-
form stakeholders, and the extent of company responsibility for foreign 
subsidiaries, suppliers, and subcontractors.230  Of particular concern in the 
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2004 Report was the need to connect such reporting to international 
frameworks, such as those developed by the United Nations, International 
Labour Organization, Organization of Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment, and the European Commission.231  The 2004 Report con-
cluded by emphasizing the need to allow non-financial reporting to evolve 
over time as companies became familiar with the requirements of the stat-
ute and tested them against international benchmarks.232   
Notwithstanding such quality issues, the number of French com-
panies who complied with the 2002 Decree requirements gradually in-
creased over time.  In a study by the French Ministry for Ecology and 
Development in 2007, it was reported that “81% of companies had at least 
made some effort” in non-financial reporting.233 
In a 2013 document outlining its CSR strategy, the French gov-
ernment reported that its laws mandating non-financial reporting had led 
to “a marked change in quality” of such reporting.234  It also cited a 2011 
study by the global accounting firm KPMG, which listed France in fourth 
place worldwide for such reporting by large companies, with an increase 
from 59% to 94% in a three year period.235  In addition, a 2015 study by 
KPMG found that the rate of CSR reporting in annual reports in France 
stood at 93%.236  Such 2015 report also observed a global increase in CSR 
reporting and attributed the increase to government regulation mandating 
such reporting.237  
                                                 
 
231 Id. at 4. 
232 Id. at 5. 
233 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères – France: Office of the Ambassador At Large for 
Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 213, at 2.  
234 République Française, supra note 209, at 11. 
235 Id at 11.  See KPMG, International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2011, 
at 10 (Figure 2). 
236 KING & BARTELS, supra note 66, at 37. 
237 Id. at 36. 
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The current version of the French NFR Law, namely Article 225-
102-1 of the French Commercial Code, as amended, covers many but not 
all of the reporting requirements of the 2014 EU Directive.238  Accord-
ingly, amendments to conform to such Directive are required, but are still 
pending at the time of writing of this article.  Among other things, some 
disclosure categories must be added in the areas of human rights and anti-
corruption and anti-bribery.  In addition, national enforcement mecha-
nisms must be put in place. 
Interestingly, before France notified its national law implementing 
the 2014 EU Directive, the French legislature passed a law on February 
21, 2017 going beyond the disclosure requirements of such Directive and 
requiring certain large companies to adopt strong due diligence measures 
sufficient to identify risks and to prevent violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, health and safety, and damage to the environment 
that could result from the activities of each covered company, its subsidi-
aries, and companies it controls, as well as suppliers and subcontractors 
with which it has established commercial relationships.239  Such legislative 
development signals the continued willingness of French lawmakers to 
tackle important CSR issues through government action.  
2. Denmark  
Denmark is another Member State with a long-standing commit-
ment to CSR.  It was the first Member State to implement the 2014 EU 
Directive into its national law.240  It first introduced CSR reporting require-
ments for certain businesses in December 2008 through an Act amending 
the Danish Financial Statements Act (“FSA”) and entitled “Accounting 
                                                 
 
238 See 2012 Decree, supra note 217. 
239 Loi n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et 
des entreprises donneuses d'ordre, available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/ 
loi/2017/3/27/2017-399/jo/texte. The law survived a constitutional challenge and be-
came effective on March 29, 2017. 
240 Danish Financial Statements Act (“Årsregnskabsloven”), cf. Consolidated Act no. 647 
of 15 June 2006, as amended by § 5 of Act no. 108 of 7 February 2007, § 63 of Act no. 
468 of 17 June 2008 and Act no. 516 of 17 June 2008 [hereinafter 2008 Act].  
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for CSR in large businesses” (“2008 Act”).241  The text of the 2008 Act 
and accompanying commentary were set forth in a 2008 document enti-
tled “Proposal for an Act amending the Danish Financial Statements Act 
(Report on social responsibility for large businesses)” (“2008 Pro-
posal”).242  The 2008 Act became effective on January 1, 2009, and became 
applicable for financial years starting on January 1, 2009 and later.243 
The reporting requirements were part of the Action Plan for Cor-
porate Social Responsibility promulgated by the Danish government in 
May 2008 (“2008 CSR Action Plan”).244  Such Action Plan stated that the 
purpose of such reporting requirements was to enhance transparency so 
that stakeholders could influence the CSR policies of businesses and in-
vestors.245  Another stated reason for introducing the reporting require-
ments was to bolster the market shares of Danish businesses by demon-
strating their commitment to sustainable growth.246  The 2008 Proposal 
for a law on CSR reporting that resulted in the 2008 Act noted these same 
two reasons for introducing CSR reporting requirements and also sug-
gested such reporting would encourage businesses and investors to “con-
tribute to solving social challenges” and in so doing, “create better busi-
ness opportunities for themselves.”247 
                                                 
 
241 Id. See Danish Business Authority, Legislation, CSRGOV, http://csrgov.dk/legislation 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2018). 
242 Danish Business Authority, Proposal for an Act Amending the Danish Financial Statements 
Act (Report on Social Responsibility for Large Businesses), 1 CSRGOV (Oct. 8, 2008) [hereinafter 
2008 Proposal], http://csrgov.dk/file/319999/proposal_report_on_social_ resp_de-
cember_2008.pdf. 
243 Id. at 3 (discussing the date the 2008 Act enters into force in Section 2). 
244 The Danish Government, Action Plan for Corporate Social Responsibility 1, 21 CSR-
GOV (May 2008), http://csrgov.dk/file/318799/action_plan_CSR_september_ 
2008.pdf.  
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 2008 Proposal, supra note 242, at 5. 
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The 2008 Act added new Section 99a to the FSA, which set forth 
the requirement that covered businesses include information in their an-
nual reports on their CSR strategies.248  Covered businesses were large 
businesses in accounting class C under the FSA, and listed companies and 
state-owned companies in accounting class D under the FSA.249  The Dan-
ish Government calculated that approximately 1,100 companies would be 
covered by the 2008 Act.250  SMEs were not covered by the reporting re-
quirement.251 
CSR was defined in the 2008 Act as “businesses voluntarily in-
clud[ing] considerations for human rights, societal, environmental and cli-
mate conditions, as well as combating corruption in their business strategy 
and corporate activities.”252  Although no specific reporting topics under 
these four broad subject matter areas were mandated in the text of the 
2008 Act, the explanatory comments in the 2008 Proposal stated that Dan-
ish companies should base their policies on “an internationally recognised 
reference framework.”253  More specifically, the 2008 Proposal noted that 
the four subject matter areas included in the definition are based on the 
U.N. Global Compact categories, which in turn are elaborated through ten 
principles.254  While appearing to recommend the U.N. Global Compact 
principles as a basis for CSR reporting, the 2008 Proposal noted that such 
principles should not be viewed as “a checklist for completion by compa-
nies” and that companies should choose the areas that are relevant to their 
                                                 
 
248 Id. at 1 (discussing the insertion of Section 99a in Section 1, ¶ 1). 
249 Id. at 6. Accounting class C covers both medium and large limited liability companies.  
Large businesses in accounting class C are businesses that exceed at least two of the 
following three size limits for medium-sized companies: total assets/liabilities of 143 mil-
lion Danish Kroner (≈ 19.2 million Euros); net revenue of 286 million Danish Kroner 
(≈ 38.4 million Euros); an average of 250 full-time employees. 
250 Id.  
251 Id. at 1, 6.  
252 2008 Proposal, supra note 242, at 1 (adding the new Section 99a-(1)).  
253 Id. at 4. 
254 Id. at 9. 
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core businesses.255  In addition to the U.N. Global Compact, the 2008 
Proposal suggested that the U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment, 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the GRI frame-
works were also useful sources for the content of CSR reporting.256 
The annual report was required to contain information on the fol-
lowing three topics:  (1) social responsibility policies of the business, in-
cluding standards, guidelines or principles in use; (2) implementation of 
such policies, including systems or procedures in place; and (3) assessment 
of work on social responsibility initiatives, including expected future out-
comes.257  No further or more specific guidance was given in the 2008 Act 
on the reporting format that should be used.258 
While the 2008 Act stated that the required disclosure should be 
included in the management review section of the annual report, compa-
nies could instead choose to disclose in a supplementary statement to the 
annual report or on the business website.259  The location of such disclo-
sure had to be stated and such disclosure had to be made available at the 
same time as the annual report.260  If a business was already reporting un-
der the U.N. Global Compact or the U.N. Principles for Responsible In-
vestment in the form of a Communication on Progress Report (“COP 
Report”), it was exempt from the reporting requirements of the 2008 Act, 
but instead was required to state in its annual report that it was taking 
advantage of the reporting exemption and to indicate where such COP 
Report was publicly available.261 
                                                 
 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 10. 
257 2008 Act, supra note 240, § 99a-(2).  
258 See id. 
259 2008 Act, supra note 240, § 99a-(3). 
260 2008 Proposal, supra note 242, at 8; 2008 Act, supra note 240, § 149a.  
261 2008 Act, supra note 240, § 99a-(7).  
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The language of the 2008 Act made clear that adoption of CSR 
policies and reporting on CSR policies were separate matters.262  Busi-
nesses with CSR policies in place were required to disclose in accordance 
with the requirements of the 2008 Act.263  Businesses were not required to 
adopt CSR policies in the first place, however.264  But if they did not, they 
had to disclose that fact in the annual report.265  
The information disclosed pursuant to the 2008 Act requirements 
had to be checked by a company’s auditor for consistency with financial 
statement disclosures (or consolidated financial statement disclosures) and 
was required to be covered by the auditor’s opinion letter.266  However, 
there was no requirement for the auditor to verify that a company’s busi-
ness operations were consistent with its CSR policies.267 
The Danish Government proposed further refinements to the 
2008 CSR Action Plan in a document entitled “Responsible Growth:  Ac-
tion Plan for Corporate Social Responsibility 2012-2015 (“2012 CSR Ac-
tion Plan”).268  The 2012 CSR Action Plan set forth forty-two initiatives 
that were grouped into four topic areas, namely respecting international 
CSR principles, building partnerships among business, government and 
civil society, increasing transparency, and establishing good frameworks 
for responsible growth through public sector actions.269  Under the topic 
                                                 
 
262 Id. § 99a(2)-(7). 
263 Id. 
264 2008 Proposal, supra note 242, at 4. 
265 2008 Act, supra note 240, § 99a-(1). 
266 2008 Proposal, supra note 242, at 8. 
267 Karin Buhmann, The Danish Reporting Requirement as Reflexive Law: Employing CSR as a 
Modality to Promote Public Policy, 1, 7–8, Univ. of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies Re-
search Paper Series No. 2011-36 (2011) (citing to Statutory Order No. 1305 16/12/2008, 
§ 135; Statutory Order No 1043 05/11/2009, § 62; Statutory Order No. 1310 
16/12/2008, § 132; Statutory Order No. 1307 16/12/2008, § 24). 
268 The Danish Government, Responsible Growth: Action Plan for Corporate Social Responsibility 
2012-2015 1, 4, 6–13 CSRGOV (Mar. 2012), http://csrgov.dk/file/318420/ uk_respon-
sible_growth_2012.pdf. 
269 Id. 
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of transparency, the 2012 CSR Action Plan announced a change to the 
CSR reporting requirements for covered companies under the 2008 Act, 
namely a mandate to report on measures taken to respect human rights 
and reduce business impacts on climate.270 
These reporting requirements were adopted by the Danish parlia-
ment on June 12, 2012, through an amendment to the FSA (“2012 
Amendment”).271   Such reporting was required even if these topics were 
not included in a covered company’s CSR policies.  If a company did not 
have a policy on these topics, they were required to make a statement to 
that effect.272  The purpose of the amendment was to encourage busi-
nesses to report on these two topics.273  However, the 2012 Amendment 
still did not require reporting on environmental, social and labor/employ-
ment-related matters or anti-corruption and anti-bribery matters. 
After passage of the 2008 Act, the Danish Ministry of Business 
and Growth in collaboration with the Copenhagen Business School as-
sessed the implementation of the non-financial reporting requirements on 
several occasions and issued reports.274  Such reports indicated that the 
                                                 
 
270 Id. at 11. 
271 Danish Financial Statements Act (“Årsregnskabsloven”), cf. Consolidated Act no. 647 
of 15 June 2006, as amended by § 5 of Act no. 108 of 7 February 2007, § 63 of Act no. 
468 of 17 June 2008 and Act no. 516 of 17 June 2008, and Act. no 117 of 21 May 2015.  
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 See e.g. Danish Commerce & Companies Agency, Corporate Social Responsibility and Re-
porting in Denmark: Impact of the Legal Requirement for Reporting on CSR in the Danish Financial 
Statements Act (Aug. 2010), https://samfundsansvar.dk/sites/default/files/ corpo-
rate_social_responsibility_and_reporting_in_denmark_september_2010.pdf [hereinafter 
2009 Report] (reporting on 2009 financial year); Danish Commerce & Companies 
Agency, Corporate Social Responsibility and Reporting in Denmark: Impact of the Second Year Legal 
Requirements for Reporting on CSR in the Danish Financial Statements Act (Nov. 2011), 
http://csrgov.dk/file/319199/corporate_social_responsibility_and_ reporting_in_den-
mark_november_2011.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Report] (reporting on 2010 financial year); 
Danish Commerce & Companies Agency, Corporate Social Responsibility and Reporting in 
Denmark: Impact of the Third Year Subject to the Legal Requirements for Reporting on CSR in the 
Danish Financial Statements Act (Mar. 2013), https:// samfundsansvar.dk/sites/de-
fault/files/csr_rapport_2013_eng.pdf (reporting on 2011 financial year); Danish Com-
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reporting requirements had had a positive effect on businesses’ work on 
CSR.275 According to such reports, over time, the number of covered com-
panies reporting as required under the FSA had increased.276  However, it 
was also observed that further improvement was needed.  For example, 
absence of reporting by some companies, lack of consistency in reporting, 
and failure of auditors to note deficiencies in company reporting, were 
mentioned.277  Lack of consistency in reporting referred to failure to dis-
close in all three required categories across all CSR policy topics.278  Audi-
tors sometimes failed to mention the observed lack of consistency in their 
reports and they also failed to note errors and omissions in some cases.279  
Most companies used qualitative reporting and few made use of indicators 
like those developed by the GRI.280 
On the other hand, the government reports stated that there were 
also positive developments such as the increased familiarity by companies 
with the statutory requirements leading to less time invested in reporting, 
gradual integration of CSR in business strategies, and development of con-
crete steps to improve CSR initiatives and CSR reporting.281  The govern-
ment reports also noted that it had become increasingly common for com-
panies to use international CSR principles as the basis for their reporting, 
especially the U.N. Global Compact.282  The government believed that the 
                                                 
 
merce & Companies Agency, Executive Summary Financial Year 2013, at 1, http://csr-
gov.dk/file/536161/executive_summary_report_financiel_year_2013. pdf [hereinafter 
2013 Report] (reporting on the implementation of the 2008 Act about the financial year 
2013). 
275 2009 Report, supra note 274, at 1. 
276 2010 Report, supra note 274, at 2. 
277 Id. at 5–6. 
278 Id. at 3. 
279 Id. at 6. 
280 2009 Report, supra note 274, at 12.  Only 38% of companies used indicators and only 
9% used the GRI indicators.  Id. 
281 2010 Report, supra note 274, at 6. 
282 Id. at 15.  Some 34% of covered companies used international CSR standards for 
reporting in 2010.  Id. 
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statutory reporting requirements were the reason that an increasing num-
ber of Danish companies, some 20% of covered companies, had sub-
scribed to the U.N. Global Compact.283 
In the most recent such report covering the financial year 2013, 
the Danish Government assessed compliance by the estimated 1,100 cov-
ered companies with the statutory requirements on CSR reporting. It was 
reported that 96% of such companies disclosed whether they had a CSR 
policy, and of these, 77% disclosed that they did.284  Of those companies 
with CSR policies, 97% disclosed the contents of such policy, 90% re-
ported on their implementation of such policy, and 83% assessed the im-
pacts of their work on CSR.285  Regarding the requirements to account for 
policies relating to human rights and climate impacts, 66% and 72% of 
companies, respectively, complied.286  The topics most frequently included 
were, in descending order of frequency, environmental matters, social con-
ditions, climate impacts, anti-corruption, and human rights.287  The major-
ity of covered companies placed the required CSR information in the man-
agement review section of the annual report, with the rest of the compa-
nies using a supplementary report in most cases and a smaller number 
posting the disclosure on the company’s website.288 
Pursuant to the mandate of the 2014 EU Directive to implement 
non-financial reporting requirements into national laws, the FSA was 
amended on May 21, 2015 (“2015 Act”).289  The 2015 Act contained new 
                                                 
 
283 Id. 
284 2013 Report, supra note 274, at 1. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at 2. 
289 See Danish Business Authority, Implementation in Denmark of EU Directive 2014/95/EU 
on the Disclosure of Non-financial Information, CSRGOV 1 (May 2015), http://csr-
gov.dk/file/557863/implementation-of-eu-directive.pdf [hereinafter 2015 Act]. 
684          TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW          [Vol. 19 
 
requirements for CSR reporting. This was the first implementation of the 
2014 EU Directive by any Member State.290  
The 2015 Act goes beyond the requirements of the 2014 EU Di-
rective by widening its applicability to include all covered companies sub-
ject to the CSR reporting requirements under the FSA.  The 2014 EU 
Directive required Member States to enact legislation covering, at a mini-
mum, companies that fall into the category of PIEs with at least 500 em-
ployees.291 Prior to the 2015 Act, the CSR reporting requirements of the 
FSA applied to large businesses in accounting class C and to all entities in 
accounting class D.292  While the FSA does not use the term PIEs, under 
such Act, businesses in accounting class D, i.e. listed companies and state-
owned companies, are deemed to be of public interest. There are approx-
imately 50 such companies with at least 500 employees out of the approx-
imately 1,100 covered companies subject to the CSR reporting require-
ments of the FSA.293  For those companies, the 2015 Act requirements 
will take effect for financial years starting on or after January 1, 2016.  For 
the other approximately 1,050 covered companies, the 2015 Act require-
ments will be applicable for financial years commencing on or after Janu-
ary 1, 2018.294  
At the time the 2015 Act was passed, the Danish government stated 
that the 2014 EU Directive was based on the same principles as the CSR 
reporting requirements in the FSA.  Both provided for “fundamental flex-
ibility” for business, meaning that covered companies voluntarily decided 
whether to adopt a CSR policy and merely had to “be open about the 
choices they make.”295  Notwithstanding such common ground, there 
                                                 
 
290 Denmark Transposes EU NFR Directive, GRI, (July 1, 2015), https://www.globalreport-
ing.org/information/news-and-press-center/Pages/ DENMARK-TRANSPOSES-EU-
NFR-DIRECTIVE.aspx. 
291 2014 EU Directive, supra note 12.  
292 2008 Proposal, supra note 242, at 6. 
293 2015 Act, supra note 289, at 4. 
294 Id. at 1. 
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were additional requirements contained in the 2014 EU Directive that ne-
cessitated changes to the FSA and that the 2015 Act incorporated in 
amended Section 99a.  The 2014 EU Directive required companies to re-
port, at a minimum, “environmental policies, including measures to reduce 
the climate impacts of the undertaking’s activities as well as social condi-
tions and employee conditions, respect for human rights, and measures to 
fight bribery and corruption.”296  Businesses must comply with this re-
quirement or, if they do not have such policies, explain the reasons, which 
requirement has been labelled “comply or explain”.297  Prior to the 2015 
Act, covered companies under the FSA were only required to report on 
human rights and climate impact policies and were allowed to report on 
other categories on a voluntary basis.  If they had no policies in the two 
required categories or no CSR policies at all, they merely had to make a 
statement to that effect.  Due to the need to comply with the minimum 
requirements of the 2014 EU Directive, the 2015 Act requires covered 
companies to describe their CSR policies in at least the areas listed in the 
2014 EU Directive, including any standards, guidelines or CSR principles 
used.298 For each policy area, a covered company must state whether it has 
a policy for such area and the nature of the policy.299  Following the “com-
ply or explain” approach of the 2014 EU Directive, if a covered company 
does not have a policy in one or more of the enumerated areas, it must 
then disclose this fact, along with the reasons for such omission, in the 
case of each omitted policy area.300  
Although the 2015 Act only specifies the minimum topic areas that 
are the subject of CSR policy disclosure, and does not recommend or re-
quire a specific reporting standard, the accompanying commentary pro-
vides greater detail on the content of such required disclosure than was 
                                                 
 
296 Id. at 2 (citing 2014 EU Directive, supra note 12).  
297 Id. at 4; see 2014 EU Directive, supra note 12, at art. 1, ¶ 1 (referring to Article 19a-(1)). 
298 2015 Act, supra note 289, at 2 (discussing the addition of Section 99a-(2), subsection 
(2)). 
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300 Id. at 4, 10 (discussing the addition of Section 99a-(3)). 
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previously available to Danish companies.301  While such guidance is help-
ful, the 2015 Act still fails to mandate a uniform reporting standard and it 
does not require the use of non-financial key reporting indicators.  Rather 
than developing a Danish reporting standard or adopting one of the many 
available international standards as the basis for CSR reporting, the 
amended FSA does not go beyond the minimum requirements of the 2014 
EU Directive in this regard. 
Other changes to the FSA necessitated by the 2014 EU Directive 
and implemented through the 2015 Act include requirements for covered 
companies to disclose their business models, due diligence processes im-
plemented, principal risks related to business activities including those 
with a special risk of negative impacts in the enumerated CSR policy areas 
and related risk management strategies, and use of non-financial key per-
formance indicators, if any.302  These new requirements build upon and 
expand the 2008 Act language on reporting on the existence, implementa-
tion, and assessment of CSR policies.303  However, there is no uniform 
reporting format mandated. 
Other requirements of the 2008 Act touching on location of the CSR 
statement in the management review section or alternatives for satisfying 
the disclosure requirement, reporting requirements for subsidiaries and 
corporate groups, and audit requirements remain fundamentally un-
changed.304  The 2015 Act grants authority to the Danish Business Au-
thority to promulgate rules on alternative means of disclosing required in-
formation if not contained in the management review section and on the 
terms of CSR reporting according to international guidelines and princi-
ples.305 
                                                 
 
301 See id. 
302 2015 Act, supra note 289, at 2 (discussing the addition of Section 99a-(2), subsections 
(3)–(5)). 
303 2008 Proposal, supra note 242, at 9.  
304 2015 Act, supra note 289, at 11–14. 
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Since the 2015 Act only became effective for PIEs with more than 
500 employees for financial years starting in January 2016 and after, it is 
too soon to assess the impact of the new CSR reporting requirements on 
the basis of actual reporting trends, as was done in prior years by the Dan-
ish government.  However, some commentators have already weighed in, 
predicting that the more specific requirements mandated by the 2014 EU 
Directive and implemented in the 2015 Act will increase the quantity but 
not the quality of CSR reporting.306  This is attributable to the failure to 
set forth detailed rules and standards for the collection and processing of 
non-financial information.307 
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE NEW EUROPEAN UNION APPROACH TO  
NON-FINANCIAL REPORTING  
At the time of its adoption, the 2014 EU Directive was lauded by 
then European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Michel 
Barnier as an important step forward in “modernising the disclosure of 
relevant and useful non-financial information . . . .”308  According to Com-
missioner Barnier, such transparency leads to companies taking a “longer 
term perspective in their decision-making . . . [leading to] lower financing 
costs, attract[ing] and retain[ing] talented employees, and ultimately [be-
coming] more successful,” consequences that are “important for Europe’s 
competitiveness and the creation of more jobs.”309 
Although the Directive represents a significant achievement for 
the EU because it promotes CSR reporting among a large group of coun-
tries with significant business interests, namely the 28 Member States, 
there are a number of troubling issues that can be raised about the Di-
rective and unanswered questions concerning its effectiveness still remain.  
                                                 
 
306 Daniel Gergely Szabo & Karsten Engsig Sorensen, New EU Directive on the Disclosure of 
Non-financial Information (CSR), 12 EUR. CO. AND FIN. L. REV. 307, 331–332 (2015). 
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308 European Commission Statement, Improving Corporate Governance:  Europe’s Largest Com-
panies Will Have to be More Transparent About how They Operate, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
PRESS RELEASE DATABASE (Apr. 15, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_STATEMENT-14-124_en.htm [hereinafter 2014 EC Statement].  
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This Section IV will critique the 2014 EU Directive and the trend it rep-
resents for non-financial reporting.  It will also speculate about the possi-
bility that the Directive as adopted will not achieve its stated policy goal 
of improving non-financial reporting in Europe.  
A. Critique of the 2014 EU Directive  
There are several weaknesses of the 2014 EU Directive that will 
be addressed in this Section IV.A.   These include its limited coverage of 
enterprises, lack of uniform reporting standards, too much flexibility for 
covered businesses regarding content and location of disclosure, lack of 
strong verification requirements, and lack of strong penalties or other rem-
edies for disclosure violations.   
1.  Limited Coverage of Enterprises   
First, the 2014 EU Directive is applicable only to large PIEs and 
also does not cover SMEs.  These features limit the impact that the 2014 
EU Directive will have.  As the 2014 EU Directive was originally pro-
posed, it was applicable to companies with an average number of employ-
ees exceeding 500 during the financial year and with a balance sheet total 
of at least EUR 20 million or a net turnover of EUR 40 million.310  The 
EU estimated that such proposed Directive would apply to 18,000 enti-
ties.311  However, as adopted, the 2014 EU Directive was applicable only 
to PIEs with an average number of employees exceeding 500 during the 
financial year.312  As a result, the number of entities that will be covered is 
estimated to be only 6,000, two-thirds less than the original number of 
entities that would have been covered under the proposed Directive.313  
This was a curious policy choice in view of the fact that the European 
Commission had noted that the purpose of the 2014 EU Directive was to 
                                                 
 
310 See 2013 EU Impact Assessment, supra note 183, at 5, 11.   
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address the inadequate transparency of non-financial information, both in 
quantity and quality.314  The European Commission had noted that only 
an estimated 2,500 out of a total of 42,000 EU large companies formally 
disclosed non-financial information on an annual basis.315  It also noted 
quality issues in information that was disclosed, finding that such infor-
mation was “often lacking in materiality, or not sufficiently balanced, ac-
curate and timely,” as well as showing gaps in reporting on “policies and 
risk-management, as well as on specific topical areas (human rights, cor-
ruption).”316 
In addition, the 2014 EU Directive does not cover SMEs. In the 
2011 CSR Strategy, the European Commission noted that its new defini-
tion of CSR, namely “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on 
society,” required that enterprises integrate CSR into their business oper-
ations and core strategies.317  However, the European Commission also 
noted that for SMEs, such CSR process was likely “to remain informal 
and intuitive.”318  This language signaled that SMEs would be treated dif-
ferently than large enterprises in respect of their CSR obligations.  The 
2011 CSR Strategy went on to suggest that the European Commission 
would support capacity building for SMEs.319  
In both the 2014 EU Directive and the 2013 EU Proposal, the 
European Commission stated that the overall regulatory burden for busi-
ness at both the European and national levels should be reduced, espe-
cially for SMEs.320  Both documents stated that the non-financial disclo-
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sure requirements should be made applicable only to certain large enter-
prises and that SMEs should be exempted from such requirements.321  The 
basis for this policy decision was further explained in the 2013 EU Impact 
Assessment, in which it appears that in the public consultations held in 
connection with the 2013 EU Proposal, the interests of the users of non-
financial information emerged as being at odds with the reporting prefer-
ences of the providers of such investors. While investors and non-govern-
mental organizations argued that the costs of reporting would be out-
weighed by the benefits to civil society due to increased transparency and 
the ability to make investment decisions based on a long-term perspective, 
the majority of businesses argued that stricter disclosure requirements 
could be overly burdensome, in particular for SMEs, and impact compet-
itiveness.322  
Political scientist Daniel Kinderman, who has studied the political 
dynamics and interest group activities associated with CSR initiatives in 
Europe, has noted that the reason for the exclusion of SMEs was due to 
German opposition, particularly from the business sector, which includes 
many SMEs.323  As he has pointed out, the original proposal for the Di-
rective was intended to cover a larger group of enterprises, but it was con-
siderably watered down in a number of respects, including the entities that 
would be covered, due to opposition from the business community, espe-
cially in Germany.324  Based on Kinderman’s account of the negotiations 
over the 2014 EU Directive, three countries exerted the most influence, 
namely France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, with France being the 
strongest supporter and attempting to strengthen the original proposal, 
Germany rejecting the entire proposal, and the United Kingdom propos-
ing amendments to water down the proposal in some respects even 
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though it has been supportive of non-financial reporting in the past.325  
When the European Commission announced its 2011 CSR Strategy, the 
largest and most powerful organizations of businesses in Germany op-
posed the idea of regulation, stating that the European Commission was 
encroaching on corporate discretion and that non-financial reporting 
should remain voluntary.326  In particular, this German coalition of busi-
nesses stated that “[t]he bureaucratic burden—especially for small and me-
dium-sized companies—would be considerable and greatly outweigh any 
benefits.”327  The German federal government supported the stance of 
German businesses, stating in a government position paper that it was op-
posed to “new statutory duties to disclose social and environmental infor-
mation [since] [t]hese would amount to a departure from the voluntary 
principle and would entail considerable bureaucracy, particularly for small 
and medium-sized enterprises in Germany.”328 
2. Lack of Uniform Reporting Standards 
Second, the 2014 EU Directive does not adopt uniform reporting 
standards as to content or format and does not require the use of key 
performance indicators, such as those contained in the GRI frameworks.  
The European Commission was directed to prepare guidelines to facilitate 
disclosure, taking into account international best practices.  As discussed 
in Section III.A above, the European Commission did in fact issue the 
2017 NFR Guidelines.  However, such Guidelines do not add much detail 
to what is set forth in the 2014 EU Directive regarding the content or 
format of reporting.  The Guidelines do provide some examples of mate-
rial information that companies could consider disclosing, along with ex-
amples of related key performance indicators that they might also include.  
However, the 2017 NFR Guidelines do not suggest any particular report-
ing framework for use by the Member States.  There are numerous such 
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reporting frameworks to choose from, as discussed in Section III.A above.  
Instead, the 2017 NFR Guidelines merely repeat language from the 2014 
EU Directive that states “[a] company may rely on high quality, broadly 
recognized national, EU-based or international frameworks when prepar-
ing its non-financial statement”  and states further that companies should 
disclose which frameworks they used for specific disclosures to enhance 
clarity and comparability.329  This language adds no clarification regarding 
the requirements of the 2014 EU Directives and therefore provides no 
useful guidance to Member States.  Moreover, it must be remembered that 
such Guidelines are not binding on the Member States, further weakening 
their usefulness. 
 The lack of a recommended reporting standard is at odds with 
current practice among companies, many of whom have adopted the GRI 
frameworks to use for their non-financial reporting.  A better approach 
than the flexible approach of the 2014 EU Directive would be to adopt a 
framework that has become the gold standard in sustainability reporting, 
namely the GRI frameworks.  As discussed in Section II above, the 2015 
KPMG Report states that three-quarters of Global Fortune 250 compa-
nies use the GRI frameworks.330  In addition, the GRI has formed alliances 
with institutional partners such as the U.N. Global Compact, and in that 
way, actively promotes convergence around its key indicators.  Finally, the 
GRI frameworks have been adopted in some national legislation. 
The GRI approach has its critics.  Among them is law professor 
Galit Sarfaty, who has criticized the GRI frameworks for promoting a 
check the box mentality.331  It has been described as “accountant driven,” 
suggesting that there is no lawyerly input on disclosure areas where legal 
expertise is helpful, such as in the area of human rights norms and com-
pliance.  It lacks a focus on impacts and it lacks uniform guidelines on 
third party assurances. It divides indicators into core indicators and op-
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tional indicators, although some of the optional indicators may be im-
portant to certain stakeholders.  It fosters a culture of a reporting treadmill 
in which the focus is on extensive data gathering, leaving few resources 
that can be devoted to organizational change.  The GRI rankings focus on 
the level of disclosure rather than the quality and accuracy of sustainability 
performance. 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the GRI frameworks have 
the benefit of having gained broad acceptance in the business community 
and are widely recognized around the world.  As of yet, no second-best 
alternative has emerged to challenge the preeminence of the GRI frame-
works, at least among large companies such as those in Global Fortune 
250. 
The 2014 EU Directive adopts a minimum harmonization ap-
proach, meaning that Member States are required to meet only the mini-
mum requirements set forth in the Directive, although they are free to 
adopt higher standards if they choose.  The European Commission con-
sidered a wide range of alternative approaches to non-financial reporting 
requirements apart from the minimum harmonization approach that was 
eventually incorporated in the Directive.  In the 2013 EU Impact Assess-
ment, the European Commission outlined these policy options and also 
assessed such policy options against the criteria of effectiveness in meeting 
the objectives of the Directive, including compliance costs, competitive-
ness, and coherence with other EU legislation.332  Full harmonization 
through the introduction of detailed reporting requirements in accord with 
an internationally accepted standard and full harmonization through the 
adoption of a new mandatory EU standard developed specifically for this 
purpose were also considered.333  The 2013 EU Impact Assessment con-
cluded that there would be benefits from such full harmonization ap-
proaches, noting that full harmonization through mandatory EU stand-
ards would “increase significantly the quantity and quality of disclosed in-
formation” that would “generate economic benefits resulting from better 
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management and allocation of capital and an overall positive environmen-
tal and social impact.”334  Both of these alternatives were rejected on the 
grounds that such requirements would impose administrative burdens and 
would not be cost-effective.  In the case of the mandatory EU standards 
approach, the European Commission also was concerned about “the com-
pletion of a long and uncertain process of development and implementa-
tion of such standards, including thorough consultation with stakehold-
ers.”335  A final concern was with critics who thought the full harmoniza-
tion approaches would lead to “tick the box” compliance that would have 
“only limited impact on real companies’ behavior.”336 
The minimum harmonization approach may not prove optimal for 
companies that operate across national borders, which is the case for many 
of the large PIEs covered by the 2014 EU Directive.  This is because such 
enterprises will incur additional costs if they are required to comply with 
varying disclosure requirements in different Member States.  Since Mem-
ber States are only required to meet the minimum standards set forth in 
the Directive and not a set of EU prescribed standards or the standards 
imposed by a designated international framework, disclosure requirements 
may well vary among Member States.  In addition, the minimum harmo-
nization approach may not prove optimal for investors who seek compa-
rability across companies.  Shares of listed companies covered by the 2014 
EU Directive are often traded across national borders, creating a need on 
the part of investors for comparability of information.  The minimum har-
monization approach does not facilitate comparison of non-financial re-
porting between listed companies in different Member States.337 
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The extremely flexible approach taken to the content and format 
of such reporting seems at odds with the statements that have been made 
over the years in EU policy statements and in the 2014 EU Directive itself 
regarding the need for uniformity and consistency in non-financial report-
ing.  For example, the 2014 EU Directive listed one of its policy goals as 
“the consistency and comparability of non-financial infor-
mation . . . throughout the Union” and “coordination of national provi-
sions concerning the disclosure of non-financial information in respect of 
certain large undertakings . . . [which is] necessary . . . because most of 
those undertakings operate in more than one Member State.”338  In the 
2001 Green Paper in which the European Commission started to develop 
a CSR policy for the EU, the Commission noted that some of the prob-
lems associated with CSR reporting included lack of consistency in con-
tent, reporting format and use of reliability and audit standards, as well as 
the proliferation of reporting frameworks and the lack of coherence 
among such standards.339  The Commission also noted the emergence of 
the GRI Guidelines as evidence of best practices on environmental re-
porting.340  These statements of EU policy goals are evidence that the Eu-
ropean Commission is well aware of the problems associated with con-
sistency and comparability among EU companies engaged in non-financial 
reporting.  Yet it chose to adopt the 2014 EU Directive, which failed to 
fully address many of the issues noted in its policy statements. 
Some of the weaknesses of the 2014 EU Directive may be attribut-
able to concerns about imposing costs associated with such reporting on 
businesses. In fact, in the 2013 EU Impact Assessment that preceded 
adoption of the 2014, EU Directive, the European Commission calculated 
the costs of the new disclosure requirements relating to drafting, publica-
tion, and specific staff training or data collection, both on a per company 
and total costs basis.341 
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This lack of uniform reporting standards in the 2014 EU Directive 
may limit the usefulness of CSR reporting for investors seeking to com-
pare businesses from different Member States and may create difficulties 
for companies operating across national borders.  The lack of a require-
ment for use of key performance indicators also calls into question 
whether there will be any improvement in the quality of CSR reporting as 
a result of the Directive. 
3. Too Much Flexibility Given to Covered Businesses 
Third, although the 2014 EU Directive has been described as 
“mandating” CSR reporting, it provides a great deal of “flexibility” to busi-
nesses on the nature of their CSR reporting, including its content and place 
of publication, and even on the question of whether businesses need to 
report at all.  Examples of such flexibility include the “comply or explain” 
approach to the content of non-financial reporting, namely the option of 
businesses to omit reporting on issues for which they have failed to adopt 
policies, as long as they provide a reasoned explanation for why such pol-
icies are not in place. 342  This provision seemingly undercuts incentives 
reporting companies would otherwise have to improve their performance 
on CSR topics since they are not held accountable for failing to adopt 
policies in the first place.  Another example is the option of business to 
deviate from the requirement of including non-financial reporting in their 
annual reports, which requirement would make such information readily 
accessible to investors and other stakeholders along with financial and 
other relevant disclosure mandated in such reports.  Instead, companies 
issuing standalone reports may substitute such reporting for the required 
annual report statement and may provide such information on their web-
sites.  This may prove convenient for management but may make the in-
formation more difficult to find and access for investors and other stake-
holders. 
The European Commission has described the regulatory approach 
of the 2014 EU Directive as “smart regulation” or a “smart mix approach” 
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involving a mixture of policy approaches combining government regula-
tion that allows significant choices about disclosure to be made on a vol-
untary basis by businesses.343  As such, the “smart mix approach” repre-
sents an intermediate position that bridges the gap between voluntary dis-
closure and mandatory reporting requirements.   
The “smart mix approach” of the 2014 EU Directive might be 
viewed as an example of reflexive regulation, an emerging concept that 
some commentators have advocated as a mechanism to govern corporate 
behavior.  Reflexive regulation stands in contrast to substantive govern-
ment regulation of business, which commentators have criticized for its 
lack of effectiveness in producing socially responsible behavior.344  It has 
been described as “a regulatory system that recognizes the limited ability 
of the law in a complex society to direct social change in an effective man-
ner” through a process that “aims to guide behavior and promote self-
regulation.”345  Such regulation is deemed reflexive because “it encourages 
corporations to constantly re-examine their practices and reform those 
practices based on the most current information.”346  Business school pro-
fessor David Hess has suggested that CSR could be promoted through a 
reflexive law approach to what he termed “social reporting,” which ap-
pears to be synonymous with non-financial reporting as defined in this 
article. 347  He believes that social reporting will lead to improved corporate 
decision-making that is responsive to expectations of stakeholders, as such 
expectations change over time.348  
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In principle, building flexibility into government instruments on 
non-financial reporting through use of such a reflexive regulation ap-
proach may lead to greater CSR.  However, in the case of the 2014 EU 
Directive, such flexibility may be viewed as weakening the mandate for 
enhanced reporting.  It may be the case that building flexibility into the 
Directive was a necessary compromise given the strong opposition by 
business to government regulation of non-financial reporting, as reported 
by commentators like Kinderman, among others.349  The “flexibility” to 
deviate from the requirements of the 2014 EU Directive may be attractive 
to businesses seeking to design their own CSR programs without interfer-
ence from government regulators.  However, such flexibility may undercut 
incentives to improve existing non-financial reporting and CSR policies of 
businesses.  This approach calls into question whether the 2014 EU Di-
rective will have its intended impact of increasing transparency and its sug-
gested attendant benefits.350  
4.  Lack of Strong Verification Requirements   
Fourth, the 2014 EU Directive does not require Member States to 
provide for verification of the truthfulness of the non-financial infor-
mation disclosed by companies, although the statutory auditor will be re-
quired by Member States to check whether the non-financial statement 
has been provided.351  The Directive states that Member States “may re-
quire that the information in the non-financial statement . . . be verified 
by an independent assurance services provider,” but there is no firm re-
quirement that such verification be provided.352  The lack of a requirement 
for third party assurances that what is being reported by companies accu-
rately reflects their policies can be viewed as weakening the non-financial 
reporting requirements and may lead stakeholders to question the veracity 
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of the information provided by companies, thereby undermining its use-
fulness.  It also limits the incentives companies may have to provide accu-
rate and complete information. 
5.  Lack of Strong Penalties or Other Remedies for Disclosure 
Violations 
Fifth, there are no consequences or penalties for non-disclosure 
spelled out in the Directive.  This is left to the Member States to decide 
with the Directive stating in the preamble only that “Member States 
should ensure that effective national procedures are in place to enforce 
compliance with the obligations laid down by this Directive.”353  This pro-
vision allows Member States to put in place their own compliance mech-
anisms and remedies, but not to conform to any particular standard.  This 
provision potentially weakens the mandate of the 2014 EU Directive by 
failing to require strong enforcement mechanisms to address non-compli-
ance.  
B. Likelihood of Success of the 2014 EU Directive  
The preceding Section IV.A of this paper set forth several reasons 
that the 2014 EU Directive may be viewed as a weak mandate for non-
financial reporting by companies in EU Member States.  The consequence 
of the flaws in the 2014 EU Directive is that such Directive may be inef-
fective in achieving its policy goals of increased transparency by compa-
nies and the supposed attendant benefits that motivated the European 
Commission to adopt the Directive in the first place. 
It is not possible currently to assess the effectiveness of the 2014 
EU Directive in achieving its stated policy goals.  For one thing, not all 
Member States have transposed the Directive into their national laws and 
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for those that have, the European Commission has noted that some Mem-
ber States’ laws fail to conform to the Directive.354  Even more im-
portantly, the requirements of the Directive are applicable only to fiscal 
years beginning on January 1, 2017, or during calendar year 2017.355  Many 
companies have not yet reported under the new requirements, so it is im-
possible to determine at this point whether the concerns expressed above 
about flaws in the 2014 EU Directive will prove valid or not.  Such an 
assessment cannot be made until more time has passed, the EU Member 
States take further action to implement the Directive into their national 
laws, and companies adopt new reporting practices for CSR information.  
Empirical studies will be needed at such future date to determine how 
such new reporting practices are working, including whether the Directive 
is fostering a higher quantity and quality of non-financial reporting and 
whether such information is fulfilling the informational needs of stake-
holders.  
In the meantime, however, it is possible to speculate about the 
likelihood that the 2014 EU Directive will foster better CSR reporting 
practices, based on studies that appear in the accounting literature.  There 
is a body of academic literature in the field of sustainability accounting that 
questions whether government regulation mandating non-financial disclo-
sure alone results in better levels of disclosure.  The literature consists of 
empirical studies of the impact of mandatory CSR reporting laws that were 
in place prior to adoption of the 2014 EU Directive.  Several of such stud-
ies have concluded that mandating CSR reporting has had only limited 
success in increasing the number of companies reporting or the quality of 
such reporting.  This body of literature is relevant to the question of 
whether the 2014 EU Directive will result in improved CSR reporting. 
For example, Luque-Vilchez and Larringa studied the impact of 
Spain’s 2011 Sustainable Economy Law (“2011 SEL”) and concluded that 
it was a failure, having no impact in terms of the number of companies 
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that reported and a slight impact in terms of improved quality of report-
ing.356  From their empirical work, the authors concluded that disclosure 
regulation by itself may be insufficient to improve CSR reporting.  The 
authors identified several reasons for the limited impact of the mandatory 
reporting law.  First, there was no consensus on the meaning of CSR that 
emerged after stakeholder consultations convened by the Spanish govern-
ment prior to enactment of the law.357  Instead, the authors contend that 
there was conflict between members of the corporate and civil society 
camps.358  Business argued for voluntary reporting, while civil society fa-
vored mandatory reporting.359  This lack of shared expectations made it 
difficult for a consensus to emerge.360  Second, the practices mandated by 
the 2011 SEL did not correspond to existing reporting norms.361  Prior to 
the 2011 SEL, large companies  issued sustainability reports using the GRI 
frameworks as a standard and they continued to do so even after enact-
ment of the 2011 SEL.362  Finally, there was no enforcement mechanism 
put in place by the 2011 SEL, leading to a lack of clarity on what consti-
tuted compliance with the law.  According to the authors, this could have 
been clarified by setting forth guidelines for reporting and a process for 
submitting CSR reports to the relevant regulator, namely the State Council 
of Corporate Social Responsibility.363   
These conclusions about the lack of effectiveness of government 
mandates are consistent with those reported in other published studies.  
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For example, Costa and Agostini studied the effect of an Italian law cov-
ering the disclosure of environmental and labor issues that implemented 
the 2003 EU Directive. 364  While they found an increase in the quantity of 
information disclosed, the quality of such reporting did not improve.365  
Costa and Agostini concluded this was the result of two factors, namely 
(1) lack of focus on stakeholder engagement and institutional change in 
which an accountability mechanism was linked to the disclosure require-
ment and (2) the ambiguous nature of the disclosure mandate, which set 
forth overly broad and vague standards for non-financial reporting.366 
In a study of the impact of France’s NRE, Chauvey et al. con-
cluded that the goal of increased transparency remained unmet.367  They 
examined changes in CSR disclosure by French companies over the time 
period from 2004 to 2010.  The study noted that while there were increases 
in the quantity and breadth of disclosure by such companies, there was no 
improvement in informational quality.368  As a result Chauvey et al. deter-
mined that the NRE reporting requirements were moving in the direction 
of “normativity,” namely viewed by actors as binding, but had not yet 
achieved that status.369  The results reported by Chauvey et al. are con-
sistent with other studies conducted on the impact of Article 116 of the 
NRE, which studies were discussed in Section III.C above.  Those studies 
also noted low quality of reporting, attributable to various factors includ-
ing lack of reporting standards and ambiguities in the legal requirements, 
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although over time the quantity of such reporting appears to have in-
creased.370 
Regarding the experience of Denmark, another EU Member State 
discussed in Section III.C above and an early adopter of mandated non-
financial reporting, there is evidence that the amount of non-financial re-
porting increased as a result of the 2008 Act.371  However, problems were 
reported with non-compliance by some companies, including inconsisten-
cies in reporting and failure of auditors to note deficiencies.372  
These empirical studies are relevant to an assessment of the 2014 
EU Directive and can be read as calling into question the potential effec-
tiveness of such Directive.  This conclusion can be drawn from the fact 
that, although the Directive broadens the group of countries whose com-
panies are now required to report CSR information, and although the Di-
rective is more specific than the 2003 EU Directive in terms of the topics 
that must be covered and where such information should be presented, 
the “smart mix approach” of the 2014 EU Directive substantially weakens 
its mandate.  In short, the 2014 EU Directive is not a strong mandate for 
non-financial reporting and does not seem that different from its prede-
cessor Directive.  There is little reason to think that the 2014 EU Directive 
will have a significant impact at this early stage of its implementation on 
the non-financial disclosure practices of business. 
Although the empirical studies cited above relate to laws mandat-
ing non-financial reporting that predate the 2014 EU Directive, such stud-
ies suggest that new and updated laws put in place to implement such Di-
rective by themselves may have only limited impact on CSR reporting 
practices.  In explaining the lack of impact in the earlier time period, the 
authors of these studies cite various factors, including vague standards, 
lack of accountability or enforcement mechanisms, and lack of a shared 
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understanding of CSR, among other things.  Some studies have focused 
on lack of stakeholder engagement and the problem of “normativity,” 
namely the failure of actors to see rules as binding.  The issue of norma-
tivity was noted in the Chauvey et al. study of the impact of the NRE in 
France and has been mentioned in other studies in the sustainability ac-
counting literature.373  To take another example, Bebbington et al. reported 
in their comparative study of non-financial reporting regimes in Spain and 
the United Kingdom that “formal legislation alone may not be sufficient 
to create a norm.”374  Other prerequisites for the legitimacy of norms must 
also be present in order for the norm to take hold and be widely accepted.  
This was the explanation offered by the authors of that study for the fail-
ure of full compliance with a mandated environmental reporting regime in 
Spain compared to the wide acceptance of a set of voluntary environmen-
tal reporting norms in the electric industry in the United Kingdom.375  To 
put it another way, a government mandate may not be a sufficient condi-
tion for a norm to be widely accepted and complied with.   
Some of the other necessary conditions that might be required be-
fore the 2014 EU Directive achieves its desired effects could include the 
following:  stronger and clearer standards regarding both the content of, 
and the framework for, non-financial reporting, enumerated sanctions for 
failure to comply with the reporting mandate, and a requirement of inde-
pendent third party verification of the truthfulness of company disclo-
sures, among other things.   
Another challenge to the effectiveness of the 2014 EU Directive 
is the opposition by some sectors of the business community to a strong 
government mandate on non-financial reporting.  It is reported in the lit-
erature that the original wording of the draft Directive was watered down 
in several important respects in the course of negotiations in response to 
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such opposition.376  The result was the adoption of the “smart mix ap-
proach” that provided business with a large amount of flexibility on com-
pliance with the terms of the Directive.  Another result was the substitu-
tion of weakened language regarding the businesses covered by the re-
quirement, the content and format of reports, and enforcement and veri-
fication mechanisms. 
In order for the 2014 EU Directive to achieve its goals, changes 
will be needed on several fronts.  First, the flaws in the 2014 EU Directive 
identified in this article should be addressed since they significantly 
weaken the Directive’s non-financial reporting mandate.  Second, busi-
nesses opposing expanded non-financial reporting based on a cost-benefit 
analysis should rethink their calculations to take into account not just 
short-term, but also long-term gains.  Businesses might also ask whether 
they are doing the right cost-benefit analysis if they fail to account for 
social costs and externalities attributable to lack of appropriate company 
policies on CSR issues.  A revised view of cost-benefit analysis on this 
topic might convince businesses that their opposition is unwarranted.  
One commentator has suggested an alternative strategy in which business 
should look at non-financial reporting not as a cost, but as an investment 
in the long-term sustainability of a company.377  Third, the lack of clarity 
identified in Section II above surrounding the rationale for CSR policies 
generally and for non-financial reporting in particular will hamper the de-
velopment of standards for non-financial reporting unless this topic is ad-
dressed by business, government, and civil society.  This may be a long-
term project but identifying the issue will help to foster better regulation 
around this important topic.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 This article has analyzed the development of mandatory non-fi-
nancial reporting in the EU through actions taken by the European Com-
mission culminating in the 2014 EU Directive.  It has also touched on the 
development  of mandatory non-financial reporting in two Member States 
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that have been in the forefront of legal developments on this topic,  France 
and Denmark, as well as their implementation of the 2014 EU Directive.  
These twin inquiries have yielded some insights into the development of 
non-financial reporting in Europe that may be useful to other countries 
seeking to promote CSR among their own businesses using a disclosure-
based approach.  The United States is an example of a country that lacks 
a coherent regulatory approach to the topic of CSR reporting, but that 
could benefit from studying the lessons learned from the 2014 EU Di-
rective.  
 One lesson learned is that non-financial reporting is moving from 
a voluntary to a mandatory activity in Europe and that is because stake-
holders perceive that the quantity and quality of voluntary reporting is in-
sufficient to meet their needs.  Another lesson is that some form of joint 
public-private coordination may be needed to enhance such reporting by 
business, such as the “smart mix approach” used in the 2014 EU Di-
rective.  However, it should be acknowledged that there may be problems 
with business co-opting the reporting mechanisms under such an ap-
proach in order to further their own interests rather than those of their 
stakeholders.  Yet another lesson is that the process of improving non-
financial reporting may take place only gradually over a period of years 
through an evolutionary process.  Many intermediate legislative and other 
steps will need to take place before the goal of improved transparency on 
CSR issues is attained.   
 Will the 2014 EU Directive foster greater CSR reporting?  The 
answer to that question is still unknown and will not be known until sev-
eral reporting cycles under the new Member State legislation have passed.  
However, some of the empirical work on reporting trends under Member 
State laws mandating non-financial reporting that predate the 2014 EU 
Directive concluded that the quantity of such reporting may have in-
creased as a result.  This suggests that companies may be expected to at-
tempt compliance with national laws implementing the Directive and that 
we will see more non-financial reporting as a result.  What is less clear is 
whether there will be any improvement in quality of reporting.  The same 
empirical work just referred to above concluded that while there may have 
been some increase in the quantity of reporting after some national laws 
were enacted, the quality of non-financial reporting did not improve.  This 
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suggests that any new laws or any amended laws that are enacted to im-
plement the 2014 EU Directive will not necessarily improve the quality of 
reporting unless some specific guidance is given about the content of such 
reporting.  Since the 2014 EU Directive does not mandate either the re-
porting standard or the format for such disclosure, allowing considerable 
flexibility to Member States on this issue, it seems unlikely that overall 
reporting quality will increase.  In addition, there are other flaws in the 
2014 EU Directive that have been identified in this article, such as the 
limitation on the enterprises that are covered by the Directive, the lack of 
penalties and enforcement mechanisms, and the lack of a third party veri-
fication of the truthfulness of disclosures.  These weaknesses may impede 
achievement of the policy goals behind the 2014 EU Directive.  
   Will the 2014 EU Directive foster improved corporate perfor-
mance on CSR measures?  The answer to this question is even less clear, 
because improved performance is not a focus of the 2014 EU Directive.  
The 2014 EU Directive mandates reporting but it does not include a re-
quirement that the Member States include benchmarking requirements for 
business in their implementing legislation or that they otherwise tie in such 
reporting with their financial reporting.378  As critics of the movement to-
ward non-financial reporting as a regulatory mechanism for CSR have 
pointed out, non-financial reporting and achieving sustainability in busi-
ness are separate concepts and triple bottom line reporting alone may not 
be a sufficient condition for achieving sustainability.379  This question 
raises the much larger issue of the best way to promote CSR and whether 
a disclosure-based approach is a better alternative than substantive regu-
lation of corporate conduct.   
 At this point in time, there are still many other unanswered ques-
tions that remain about the future of mandatory non-financial reporting 
as an effective regulatory mechanism.  In the EU, future research will be 
needed to assess the impact of the 2014 EU Directive and its implemen-
tation by Member States and to determine if the approach taken will yield 
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positive results for business and for society as a whole.  The “smart mix 
approach” of the 2014 EU Directive may certainly be viewed as a useful 
intermediate step beyond voluntary disclosure that will foster a higher level 
of corporate disclosure, but further refinements will likely be needed if the 
policy objectives of such Directive are to be achieved.  The form that such 
improvements should take will emerge as covered companies start to re-
port under national laws adopted pursuant to the 2014 EU Directive and 
the “smart mix approach” is tested against the needs and demands of cor-
porate stakeholders. 
